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ABSTRACT 
The prohibition against insider trading is a judge-made law that has 
evolved for over fifty years, and has reached a critical impasse in two 
recent decisions in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: United States 
v. Newman and United States v. Martoma. Judges of the Second 
Circuit are sharply divided over what conduct constitutes improper 
trading on material nonpublic information (“MNPI”), leaving the law 
in profound disarray. At bottom, the disagreement stems from a 
decades-old split within the judiciary about how to (1) ensure a fair 
securities marketplace, while (2) enabling institutional analysts to 
probe for corporate information in furtherance of efficient market 
valuation of securities. 
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court in SEC v. Dirks sought to strike a 
balance between these two interests by holding that trading on MNPI 
is not illegal unless the information was disclosed in exchange for a 
personal benefit. But the effort to balance these two competing 
economic and moral interests should never have been the province of 
the judiciary, nor did its formulation ever win uniform consensus 
among the judges. After decades of struggle, the Newman/Martoma 
empasse is the consequence. Congress may finally be ready to pass a 
law of insider trading that would break the deadlock, but the bill under 
consideration ignores the market efficiency interests that undergirded 
the personal benefit element of insider trading. This Article suggests 
that before passing any law, Congress must undertake an empirical 
review of the impact that the insider trading bill would have on an 
efficient market to ensure that the final law is not only clear, but 
beneficial to the health of the capital markets. 
                                                                                                                 
* Tai H. Park is a partner at the law firm White & Case LLP. The views expressed here 
are his own and not necessarily those of the law firm. He is grateful for the thoughtful 
suggestions of his colleague, Tami Stark, as well as the insightful analysis and 
commentary of Professor Daniel Richman to an earlier draft of this Article. 
2 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... ...3 
I.  THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF A JUDGE-MADE LAW ........................ 6 
A. THE SUSTAINED CRITICISM OF INSIDER TRADING LAW ................. 6 
B. THE ORIGINAL AND UNRESOLVED POLICY DEBATE .................... 11 
1.  The Origin of Insider Trading Law: The SEC’s 
Push for Information Parity ................................................ 11 
2.  Chiarella—the Court’s Rejection of Information Parity ..... 13 
 a.  Government’s Resistance to Chiarella ......................... 19 
3.  Dirks’ “Safe Harbor” for Institutional Analysts ................. 21 
 a.  Dirks’ Fundamental Ambiguity .................................... 28 
4.  The Misappropriation Theory—Government’s Continued 
Expansion of the Law in the Second Circuit ....................... 31 
5.  Carpenter—An Impasse as Powell Departs the Bench ....... 34 
6.  Chestman—A Splintered Second Circuit ............................. 36 
7.  O’Hagan and the Misappropriation Theory ....................... 43 
8.  The “Confused Disarray” and the Dilution of  
the Personal Benefit Element .............................................. 49 
C. UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN AND THE RETURN TO DIRKS’  
“SAFE HARBOR” ......................................................................... 52 
D. THE SUPREME COURT REACTS IN SALMAN V. UNITED STATES ...... 61 
E. UNITED STATES V. MARTOMA AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S 
IMPASSE ...................................................................................... 63 
1.  Martoma I ............................................................................ 64 
2.  Martoma I Dissent ............................................................... 66 
3.  Martoma II .......................................................................... 67 
4.  Martoma II Dissent ............................................................. 70 
F.  MARTOMA’S IMPACT .................................................................... 74 
II.  A VAGUE LAW THAT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE ........ 76 
A. THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF THE LAW ........ 76 
B. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE .................................... 80 
III.  CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AT LAST? .............................................. 83 
A. THE TERMS OF THE ITPA ........................................................... 84 
B. DIRKS’ CONCERN FOR MARKET EFFICIENCY 
IS UNADDRESSED ........................................................................ 85 
C. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ITPA ON SECURITIES MARKET ............... 88 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 94 
 
2019] THE INSIDER TRADING LAW'S IMPASSE 3 
AND THE PROMISE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 2000s, when federal prosecutors in New York turned their 
sights to the hedge fund investor community, it was like shooting fish in 
a barrel. Within a few years, they had won insider trading convictions or 
guilty pleas from dozens of securities professionals.1 They then watched, 
however, as key prosecutions unraveled. In United States v. Newman, the 
Second Circuit determined that some of the defendants who had been 
convicted after a hard-fought trial were not guilty of any crime.2 The 
Court’s ruling and interpretation of the law led to reversals of other 
convictions and other charges being dismissed, even as to some 
defendants who had pleaded guilty to insider trading.3 
Three years later, a different panel of the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Martoma issued a ruling that flatly contradicted Newman.4 A 
dissenting judge disagreed, declaring that the majority’s mistaken rule 
should be ignored as dicta.5 These concerning events have caught the 
attention of Congress.  While Congress had in previous years considered, 
then abandoned, legislation, Congress may now enact a statute that 
defines the insider trading prohibition.6 The current draft of the House bill 
offers much needed clarity, but also seems incomplete. It remains to be 
seen how the Senate will react to it. 
This Article suggests that the merits of the current bill cannot be 
understood without examining the evolution of the judge-made rule of 
insider trading, which culminated in the Newman/Martoma impasse. This 
Article will examine the judiciary’s decades-long effort to define an 
insider trading law that only Congress had the power to enact under the 
separation of powers doctrine. It argues that the result has been a 
hopelessly vague law that violates the notice requirements of the Due 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Timeline: A History of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/06/business/dealbook/insider-trading-
timeline.html [https://perma.cc/LY6L-NUDZ]. 
 2. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 3. See, e.g., United States. v. Conradt, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16263, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2015). 
 4. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 55, 61 (2d Cir. 2017), opinion amended and 
superseded, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 5. See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 74 (Pooler, J., dissenting)). 
 6. See Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. § 16A (as approved 
by H.R. Fin. Serv. Comm., May 8, 2019, and committed to the H. Comm. of the Whole, 
Sept. 27, 2019). 
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Process clause. While Congress is now considering a bill that offers much 
needed clarity, this Article contends that the current draft may be 
problematic. It strongly embraces a “parity of information” vision for the 
securities market by prohibiting any trades while in possession of material 
nonpublic information (“MNPI”) obtained through a breach of a 
confidentiality obligation. In so doing, the bill gives too little regard for 
the competing interest of market efficiency. It is the conflict between 
these two important interests that mired the courts in debate for decades. 
If passed, the bill’s blanket prohibition could materially impact 
institutional investors’ ability to investigate corporate information, a task 
that is vital to accurate securities valuations. This Article supports a 
deeper analysis in the Senate that may lead to a more balanced law 
regulating the flow of corporate information in the financial markets. 
Part I summarizes the origin and evolution of the judge-made law of 
insider trading. While at its very inception, the law was heavily criticized 
for analytic flaws as well as its nature as a judge-made criminal law, 
Congress declined to act. Thus, after decades of the law evolving on a 
case-by-case basis in a “topsy turvy” fashion, the sharp disagreement 
between Newman and Martoma suggests that even judges of the Second 
Circuit cannot decide what precisely the law prohibits and why.7 The root 
cause of this ambiguity is disagreement about a policy question of great 
importance to the U.S. securities market: to what extent our interest in 
market efficiency should trump the competing interest in parity of market 
information. 
In Dirks v. SEC, Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, 
triggered this debate when he sought to prohibit abusive conduct in the 
securities market while simultaneously offering institutional analysts a 
“safe harbor” so they could continue to seek out nonpublic corporate 
information.8 Such activity was viewed as vital to the efficient and 
accurate pricing of securities. Thus, Dirks held insider trading to be 
fraudulent only if the insider engages in an intentional breach of its 
fiduciary duty, which in turn requires a personal benefit to the insider in 
exchange for disclosing MNPI.9 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(Rakoff, J.) (remarking on “the topsy-turvy way the law of insider trading has developed 
in the courts”) aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 8. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 n.17 (1983); Donald C. Langevoort, Investment 
Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (1990). 
 9. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
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On the other side of the debate, Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent 
expressed the demand for information parity.10 Compelled by the instinct 
for fairness and equity of opportunity, he argued for a more 
comprehensive ban on any trading based on confidential information.11 
He challenged the majority to explain why, exactly, personal benefit 
should be an element and what, precisely, that even means.12 This 
challenge was not answered; he was simply outvoted.13 
Though Blackmun lost that debate, in subsequent years, securities 
regulators and prosecutors took positions that had the effect of diluting 
Dirks’ core doctrine, earning Second Circuit judges’ support along the 
way.14 The law began with confusion, evolved in uncertain directions, and 
led to the startling Newman/Martoma impasse we now see within the 
Second Circuit.15 While centered on the meaning of Dirks, the two circuit 
court cases continue the policy debate that Powell and Blackmun engaged 
in over 35 years ago.16 In Newman, the Second Circuit sought to 
reinvigorate Dirks’ protection of the work of investment analysts, while 
Martoma’s majority applied reasoning consistent with Blackmun’s 
insistence on information parity.17 
Part II argues that, when viewed through the lens of an institutional 
investor, the judicial doctrine is too vague and imprecise and thus fails the 
due process standards of notice. Both the Due Process clause and the 
related separation of powers doctrine demand that Congress finally follow 
through and finish the job of legislating a coherent law. 
In the wake of Newman/Martoma, the House appears to recognize 
that Congress must act, and has taken steps toward legislation.18 But as 
Part III suggests, the draft bill fails to account for the market efficiency 
interests promoted by Dirks and Newman. The current bill fully embraces 
the information parity vision of the marketplace by effectively precluding 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See id. at 679 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. at 674. 
 13. Id. at 667. 
 14. See United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 72 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 15. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014); Martoma, 869 F.3d 
at 72. 
 16. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 438; Martoma, 869 F.3d at 72. 
 17. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 438; Martoma, 869 F.3d at 72. 
 18. See Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. § 16A (as approved 
by H.R. Fin. Serv. Comm., May 8, 2019). 
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any trades on the basis of confidential corporate information.19 Though 
the bill has the benefit of clarity, it may discourage institutional analysts 
from seeking out nonpublic information that illuminate the true condition 
of companies they analyze. If that happens, the market’s ability to value 
securities may become less reliable—instead, a company’s public 
representations about itself may become the predominant basis of its stock 
price. The consequences of such events on the efficiency of the 
marketplace are unclear. 
Part III suggests that the Senate should engage in a more probing and 
expansive evaluation of the analysts’ role in the marketplace than the 
House appears to have conducted. This is the work that should have been 
done in the early 1980s, and that neither Powell nor Blackmun were in a 
position to do. 
Whatever happens, the law will benefit from the democratic process 
of establishing a rule or set of rules that regulates the flow of corporate 
information. Not only will it be a law issued by Congress, accountable to 
the citizens of this country, it will hopefully be a clear one. Ideally, it will 
also be beneficial to the health of the securities market. 
I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF A JUDGE-MADE LAW 
A. THE SUSTAINED CRITICISM OF INSIDER TRADING LAW 
The law of insider trading is judge-made, not statutory.20 In Salman 
v. United States—the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent decision on 
insider trading—the Court opened with the following description of the 
law: 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5 prohibit 
undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by individuals 
who are under a duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from 
secretly using such information for their personal advantage.21 
In this succinct statement, the Court cites to certain language in the 
referenced statute and rule, as well as to United States v. O’Hagan.22 The 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See id. 
 20. See generally United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 21. Salman v. United States, 580 U.S. 420, 423 (2016). 
 22. Id. (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650–52 (1997)). 
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elegance of Salman’s description of the law, however, belies its true 
nature. In fact, neither section 10(b) nor the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 contains a 
prohibition on insider trading.23 The statutory anti-fraud language, to 
which the Court cites, contains no reference to “undisclosed trading,” 
“inside corporate information,” the “duty of trust and confidence,” or the 
secret use of “information for their personal advantage.”24 Each of those 
terms is a construct of caselaw and each is fraught with uncertainty. 
The Court’s key citation was to O’Hagan, which in turn relies on 
controversial reasoning contained in Chiarella v. United States and Dirks 
v. SEC, and expanded on them with more controversial reasoning.25 To 
muddy the waters further, Salman’s definition of the prohibition omitted 
the key element of “materiality,” another notoriously ambiguous concept 
that has never been defined by either Congress or the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”).26 And Salman’s description refers only 
to what the insider can or cannot do, but is silent regarding what a tippee, 
such as defendant Salman, can do and under what circumstances.27 
Far from a succinctly-stated law neatly tied to a statute, insider 
trading is a common law edifice, hand-built over the past five decades 
through myriad judicial decisions, each presenting highly fact-intensive 
disputes.28 This jurisprudence violates the separation of powers doctrine, 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (“Section 10(b) was 
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices. But neither the legislative 
history nor the statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of this case. When 
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure 
to provide information might run afoul of § 10(b)”); see also Newman v. United States, 
773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[N]either [section 10(b)] nor the regulations issued 
pursuant to it, including Rule 10b-5, expressly prohibit insider trading”). 
 24. Salman, 580 U.S. at 423 (citing 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b)(2012)) (prohibiting the use, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security,” of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules as the [SEC] may prescribe”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2016) (forbidding the 
use, “in connection with the sale or purchase of any security,” of “any device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud,” or any “act, practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a 
fraud or deceit”). 
 25. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222. 
 26. See infra discussion at note 610. 
 27. See Salman, 580 U.S. at 423. 
 28. See Paul A. Engelmayer, Congress: U.S. Needs an Insider Trading Law, 
N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202740459962 
(“[T]he development of U.S. insider trading law has been left to the federal courts. The 
U.S. Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have developed this body of law, ad hoc, 
case by case, essentially from scratch, effectively as a matter of federal common law.”). 
8 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
democratic norms, and Supreme Court jurisprudence since United States 
v. Hudson in 1812,29 which all require congressional action.30 Thus, 
scholars,31 practitioners,32 and even judges33 have criticized the judicial 
source of this law by the droves. 
Congress itself recognized its duty, as it sought to legislate a 
comprehensive insider trading law over the past several decades in fits 
and starts.34 But each time, Congress was dissuaded from doing so due to 
the SEC’s resistance to any definitive legislation.35 As one commentator 
explains: “The SEC, preferring a case-by-case construction, has 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also infra 
discussion at Part II.B. 
 30. As discussed infra at notes 577 and 578, insider trading is not alone in having 
grown out of federal common law, but as a means of regulating the flow of information 
in the nation’s securities market, its unsuitability to judicial craftsmanship is unique. 
 31. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 129, 149 (2017) (“The larger problem for Salman is that the Supreme Court let 
Congress off the hook. And by doing so, it foreclosed the corollary benefits that arise 
when a legislature sets itself to the task not only of defining crimes, but of differentiating 
them as well.”); Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court 
Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1212 
(1997) (“Many commentators have expressed concern over the absence of a statutory 
definition”) (citing James D. Cox, Choices: Paving the Road Toward a “Definition” of 
Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 381, 381 (1988) (“[I]t is imperative that Congress 
define insider trading.”); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for 
Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 251 (1991) (“Congress should replace 
the current regime with a statute that is clear and predictable.”); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Setting the Agenda for Legislative Reform: Some Fallacies, Anomalies, and Other 
Curiosities in the Prevailing Law of Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 399, 409–13 (1988) 
(calling for reform); Richard M. Phillips & Robert J. Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: 
A Need for Legislative Repair, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 71 (1984) (citing the need for 
legislation)). 
 32. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, The Insider Trading Proscriptions 
Act of 1987: A Legislative Initiative for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against 
Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 415, 416 (1988); Hervé Gouraige, Do Federal Courts 
Have Constitutional Authority to Adjudicate Criminal Insider-Trading Cases?, 69 
RUTGERS U.L. REV. 47, 118 (2016) (“They all point in the direction of statutory 
enactment and away from judicial development of legal rules based on case-by-case 
adjudication.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Engelmayer supra, note 28; Jed S. Rakoff, A Statutory Solution to 
Insider Trading, 27 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. 2 (Winter 2017). 
 34. See Rakoff, supra note 33. 
 35. See id. (“[S]uch bills have been vigorously, and successfully, opposed by the 
SEC on the ground that they were too narrow or created loopholes through which insider 
traders could escape.”). 
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discouraged efforts by Congress to legislate the parameters of section 
10(b) and insider trading.”36 With respect to a 1984 bill introduced by 
Senator Al D’Amato, “the agency ultimately opposed the legislation 
because defining insider trading might ‘reduce the Commission’s 
flexibility to prosecute evolving types of conduct.’ After all, the SEC 
noted that the existing anti-fraud provisions worked so well because of 
the adaptability inherent in the case-by-case treatment.”37 In other 
contexts, the SEC has given the same need-for-flexibility reasoning for 
its refusal to provide a clear definition of “materiality.”38 
Flexibility for the SEC has meant protean unpredictability of the law. 
Complaints about its vagueness came soon and often, from all quarters.39 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court 
Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1167 
(1997) [hereinafter “Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading”]. 
 37. Id. at 1167–68 (citing to Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on 
H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 37 (Apr. 3, 1984) (statement of John Fedders, 
Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement)). 
 38. See infra discussion at note 610. 
 39. For examples of scholarly criticism, see, e.g., Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud, 
Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341, 376–77 (1982) (“This is not 
a Supreme Court construing a complicated federal statutory scheme with wisdom, craft, 
and candor; this is a first-year Torts class on a bad day.”); Barbara Bader Aldave, 
Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 
13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984) (“The more one ponders the reasoning in Chiarella v. 
United States and Dirks v. SEC, the less one is satisfied with the Supreme Court’s 
explanation of when and why Rule 10b-5 prohibits trading in securities on the basis of 
material nonpublic information.”); Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading, supra note 36 
at 1160 (“[I]nsider trading regulation will struggle forward, ill-defined and inefficient, 
into the next century.”); Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1088–89, 1095 (2011) (arguing 
that “[t]he law of insider trading is hardly an example of clarity, and its fiduciary 
foundation is unstable,” and  that the source and the contours of a “federal fiduciary duty” 
remain cloaked in ambiguity); A.C. Pritchard, Insider Trading and the Ambiguous Quest 
for Edge, 116 MICH. L. REV. 945, 946 (2018) (“[T]he legal prohibition against insider 
dealing is beset by murky lines, the product of its essentially common law origins. Courts 
have made it up as they go along because Congress and the SEC have refused to define 
insider trading by statute or rule.”). 
For examples of judicial criticism, see United States v. Chestman (Chestman II), 947 F.2d 
551, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J., concurring) (noting that the legal rules governing 
insider trading under section 10(b) are based solely on administrative and judicial caselaw 
and  that “[t]his caselaw establishes that some trading on material nonpublic information 
is illegal and some is not. The line between the two is less than clear”); id. at 575 
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Most recently, in the wake of Newman, it was the Government telling the 
Supreme Court (1) that “market participants and analysts who seek to 
comply with the law will lack clear guidance about the legal limits of their 
conduct,”40 and (2) that Newman’s reading “blurs the line between 
legitimate and prohibited activity,”41 and creates “uncertainty in the 
financial community about the boundaries of legitimate conduct.”42 The 
Government used even more emphatic language in its bid for a rehearing 
and rehearing en banc, as it told the Second Circuit that Newman’s 
definition of personal benefit is “deeply confounding” and “certain to 
engender confusion among market participants, parties, judges, and 
juries.”43 
For all the urgency expressed by the Government, neither the en banc 
Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court granted the Government’s pleas 
for review of Newman.44 As discussed infra at Part I.E, Martoma I and II 
followed. In supporting Martoma’s bid for en banc review, the New York 
Council of Defense Lawyers, and the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers chimed in on the law’s uncertainty, as they filed an 
amicus brief claiming that Martoma II “creates great uncertainty in the 
                                                                                                                 
(referring to the Chiarella opinion as “an enigma”); id. at 576 (stating that the Dirks 
“rationale is obscure, and, as a result, so is the scope of the rule. Notwithstanding the 
ambiguities surrounding section 10(b)’s impact on insider trading—including its very 
definition—Congress has increased the penalties for violations of that prohibition”); see 
also Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (remarking on “the topsy-turvy way the law of 
insider trading has developed in the courts”). 
 40. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Newman, No. 15-137 (U.S. July 
30, 2015), 2015 WL 4572753, *33 [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari, Newman]. 
 41. Id. at *26. 
 42. Id. at *32. 
 43. Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, 
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-1837), 2015 WL 
1064423, at *2 [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Newman]. 
 44. In the wake of the Newman reversal, Congressman Jim Hines of the House of 
Representatives drafted a bill that is nearly identical to the ITPA discussed infra Part III, 
that would have codified the insider trading law to eliminate the personal benefit element 
because “there exists a fundamental disadvantage in prosecuting a crime that has never 
been properly defined.” See Press Release, Jim Himes, Himes Introduces Bipartisan Bill 
to Define and Prohibit Illegal Insider Trading (Mar. 25, 2015), 
https://himes.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/himes-introduces-bipartisan-bill-
define-and-prohibit-illegal-insider [https://perma.cc/68F7-U49W]. It is unclear why this 
bill was abandoned. 
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law of insider trading. . . .”45 The defense bar’s suggestion of en banc 
review of Martoma was also denied.46 
To understand how confounding this “uncertainty” is, one need only 
consider the dissenting opinion of Judge Rosemary Pooler in Martoma: 
[The majority asks] us to imagine a situation where a tipper “discloses 
inside information to a perfect stranger and says, in effect, you can 
make a lot of money by trading on this.” Wouldn’t it be absurd if this 
perfect stranger could not be held liable for insider trading if he went 
ahead and traded on this information? No, it would not be.47 
Pooler explained why, under Dirks, the majority’s hypothetical 
would not amount to a crime. Her dissent was entirely consistent with the 
Newman decision just two years earlier. 
B. THE ORIGINAL AND UNRESOLVED POLICY DEBATE 
To understand the Gordian knot of Newman/Martoma, it is necessary 
to summarize the tortuous, half-century path of the caselaw that brought 
us here. 
1. The Origin of Insider Trading Law: The SEC’s Push for Information 
Parity 
In 1961, in an administrative decision, Cady, Roberts & Co.,48 the 
SEC espoused the view that market regulation should protect parity of 
information or information access (“information parity”).49 The SEC held 
                                                                                                                 
   45.     Brief of N.Y.C. Council of Def. Law. and Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6, 
United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 14-3599), 2018 WL 4075999 
[hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief, Martoma]. 
 46. Order Denying Defendant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. 
Martoma, No. 14-3599 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Order Denying Rehearing, 
Martoma]. 
 47. Id. at 86 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 48. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
 49. It is, of course, not possible for market participants to always have the same or 
equal information. As a general matter, as described below, regulators have sought to 
ensure that all market participants have roughly the same access to information. If one 
already has MNPI, however, in a seller/buyer relationship, the information parity theory 
requires that the person in possession either disclose it to the trade counterparty or abstain 
from trading. 
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that insider trading violates section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).50 No language in the statute references 
insider trading, but the SEC reasoned that pursuant to the anti-fraud 
provisions of the statute, a “special obligation has been traditionally 
required of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors and controlling 
stockholders.”51 Under that obligation, “any sales by the insider must 
await disclosure of the information”52 whether made to a current 
shareholder or a new shareholder, and whether made face-to-face or over 
the exchange.53 In finding this obligation, the SEC stated: 
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the 
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and 
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information 
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.54 
As Second Circuit Judge Ralph Winter later explained, “[u]nder the 
theory of Cady, Roberts & Co., the second element furnishes the fraud or 
deception that links the prohibition on insider trading to [s]ection 10(b).”55 
Several years later, in 1968, the Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.56 essentially endorsed the SEC’s approach in 
Cady, Roberts & Co. The Court held that “anyone in possession of 
material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018) prohibits the use “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe.” Pursuant to this section, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, 
which provides in pertinent part: “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] . . . (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (1979). 
 51. Cady, Roberts, 40 SEC at 912. 
 52. Id. at 914. 
 53. Id. at 913–14. 
 54. Id. at 912. 
 55. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 574 (2d Cir. 1991) (Chestman II) 
(Winter, J., concurring). 
 56. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969). 
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or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate 
confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or 
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information 
remains undisclosed.”57 In embracing the notion of information parity, the 
Court stated that Congress had intended investors to “be subject to 
identical market risks,”58 and that the law sought to remove “inequities 
based upon unequal access to knowledge.”59 
A decade later, in 1978, the Second Circuit relied on the same 
rationale in United States v. Chiarella,60 as it affirmed the criminal 
conviction of a defendant charged with insider trading. This appeared to 
be the first criminal prosecution for such conduct under the securities 
laws.61 The defendant was an employee of a printing company who used 
client documents to determine the identity of target companies and bought 
stock in those companies.62 Consistent with previous caselaw regarding 
information parity, the Second Circuit held that “[a]nyone—corporate 
insider or not—who regularly receives material nonpublic information 
may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an 
affirmative duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose, he must abstain 
from buying or selling.”63 On this theory, Chiarella, a lowly employee of 
a printing company—who owed no duties to the target companies—was 
found guilty of “insider” trading.64 
2. Chiarella—the Court’s Rejection of Information Parity 
With Justice Lewis Powell writing for the majority, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed Chiarella’s conviction.65 The decision effectively 
rejected the interest in information parity as a basis for insider trading 
prohibitions, but the case yielded five separate opinions from the 
splintered Supreme Court.66 While Chiarella articulates insider trading 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 848. 
 58. Id. at 852. 
 59. Id. 
 60. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980). 
 61. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980). 
 62. Id. at 224. 
 63. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365. 
 64. Id. at 1362. 
 65. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 225. 
 66. Id. at 223. 
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law, it did so largely by way of limiting the law that had developed prior 
to reaching the Court. 
Research into Powell’s thinking helps to explain the limitations 
imposed by Chiarella. Professor A.C. Pritchard, who studied Powell’s 
papers, explains that the Justice had misgivings about the doctrine as he 
found it.67 He viewed “Rule 10b-5’s jurisprudence as a species of ‘federal 
common law,’”68 and thought “that the SEC should have gone to Congress 
long ago. Rather, it has elected to write expansive Rules (e.g., Rule 10b-
5, drafted by Louis Loss one morning), and then undertake to extend the 
vague language of the Rule to the edge of rationality.”69 The common law 
perspective gave courts “wide latitude for policy concerns.”70 Powell also 
“worried that prohibitions against insider trading could chill incentives 
for analysts and other market professionals to uncover information about 
publicly traded companies.”71 It was not until Dirks v. SEC that Powell 
squarely confronted the policy disagreement. 
Rather than acting on these very real concerns and declaring the law 
an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power, Powell set about trying to 
limit its reach by imposing his own “policy concerns” onto the law.72 It 
may be that by then, the “federal common law” of securities jurisprudence 
was so far along that he felt it was too late. Five years earlier, in Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Justice Rehnquist bemoaned the fact that: 
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a 
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. 
Such growth may be quite consistent with the congressional 
enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, 
. . . but it would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 
foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5.73 
Given this history, Powell may have concluded the Court had no 
choice but to create yet a new branch to the expanding “judicial oak.” The 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in 
the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 929 (2003). 
 68. Id. at 930. 
 69. Id. (quoting from Powell letter to Michael P. Dooley, Professor of Law, 
University of Virginia 1 (Oct. 25, 1980)). 
 70. Id. at 930–31. 
 71. Id. at 931. 
 72. Id. at 846, 869. 
 73. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
2019] THE INSIDER TRADING LAW'S IMPASSE 15 
AND THE PROMISE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
best he could do was attempt to limit its reach by tightly mooring insider 
trading liability to the statute it was supposedly based upon. Thus, the 
Court’s opinion begins and ends by reference to section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act.74 It emphasized that “neither the legislative history nor the 
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of this case.”75 
And at the end of its analysis of the law, the Court concluded by 
reminding the Government that “the [Exchange] Act cannot be read more 
broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit[s]. 
. . . Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it 
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based upon 
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”76 To reach 
this conclusion, the Court sought the aid of the common law of fraud: 
At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing 
reliance upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to 
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a 
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And 
the duty to disclose arises when one party has information “that the 
other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar 
relation of trust and confidence between them.”77 
In a passage that would take greater importance later in Dirks, the 
Court suggested that the “[a]pplication of a duty to disclose prior to 
trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place 
the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not benefit personally 
through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.”78 While 
Chiarella acted for personal profit, he had no duty to the company whose 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224–37. 
 75. Id. at 226 (“Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language of the 
statute . . . 10(b) does not state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive 
device. Section 10(b) was designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices . 
. . . But neither the legislative history nor the statute itself affords specific guidance for 
the resolution of this case. When Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the SEC did not 
discuss the possibility that failure to provide information might run afoul of 10(b).”) 
(citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 234–35 (citations omitted). 
 77. Id. at 227–28 n.9 (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) 
(a) (1976); as well as the American Law Institute’s comment that “silence when there is 
a duty to . . . speak may be a fraudulent act.” ALI, Federal Securities Code § 262(b) (Prop. 
Off. Draft 1978)). 
 78. Id. at 230. 
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stock he traded or to its shareholders, and thus could not be convicted of 
insider trading.79 
In so holding, the Court expressly rejected the Second Circuit’s 
ruling that “[a]nyone—corporate insider or not—who regularly receives 
material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in 
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.”80 The 
reasoning violated two precepts of securities law: “First not every 
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under 
[section] 10(b),”81 and second, it would eliminate “the element required 
to make silence fraudulent—a duty to disclose.”82 The principle espoused 
by the Second Circuit incorrectly assumed a “general duty between all 
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, 
nonpublic information.”83 According to the Court, “such a broad duty . . . 
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a 
specific relationship between two parties [and] should not be undertaken 
absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.”84 
The Court then added that “neither the Congress nor the Commission 
ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule.”85 This was a puzzling 
assertion, because the parity of information rule was effectively the 
rationale underlying both Cady, Roberts & Co. and the SEC’s litigation 
position before the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf.86 It is perplexing that 
the Court would acknowledge and even appear to rely on Cady, Roberts 
& Co.,87 but then steer it in a direction that was decidedly off-course from 
the SEC’s pathway. To do this, the Court cited with approval the two 
elements that gave rise to an obligation to disclose or abstain from trading 
described in Cady, Roberts & Co.: “the duty arose from (i) the existence 
of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing 
a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 231. 
 80. Id. at 235 n.20. 
 81. Id. at 232. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 233. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); 
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). 
 87. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–29 (1980). 
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without disclosure.”88 But instead of acknowledging that the SEC had 
stressed the second of the two elements—”unfairness” resulting from 
information disparity—Chiarella appeared to seize on the first element, 
the “relationship,” as the core foundation of a fraud prosecution.89 The 
second factor appeared to be relevant only because of its reference to the 
improper “advantage” sought by the insider. Thus, immediately after 
citing to the two Cady, Roberts & Co. factors, the Court shifted to a 
detailed discussion about the element of “duty” under the common law of 
fraud.90 
The Court also cited to Texas Gulf, but only for the proposition that 
“[t]he federal courts have found violations of [section] 10(b) where 
corporate insiders used undisclosed information for their own benefit.”91 
The Court did not even acknowledge, much less address the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion in Texas Gulf that “anyone in possession of material 
inside information” must either disclose or abstain from trading.92 Nor did 
the Court address the Second Circuit’s contention in Texas Gulf that 
Congress had intended investors to “be subject to identical market 
risks,”93 and that the law sought to remove “inequities based upon unequal 
access to knowledge.”94 Instead, the Court moved back seamlessly to a 
discussion—in the civil securities context—of the duty to disclose under 
common law, citing Second Circuit precedent.95 
Thus, the Court managed to reject the information parity rule, while 
at the same time relying on SEC and Second Circuit case law that 
effectively relied on that same doctrine.96 In any event, the Court 
concluded that “a duty to disclose under [section] 10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.”97 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 227. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 227–29 
 91. Id. at 229 (citing Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 833). 
 92. See id.; cf. Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 848. 
 93. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222; cf. Texas Gulf at 852. 
 94. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222; cf. Texas Gulf at 852. 
 95. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222. 
 96. Oddly, in Dirks v. SEC, Justice Powell’s majority opinion states that the 
Chiarella majority “accepted” the SEC’s formulation of both elements of Cady, Roberts. 
Dirks, 681 F.2d 824 at 834. 
 97. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (citations omitted). Seeking to salvage the conviction, 
the Government argued Chiarella was guilty because he had breached a duty to his 
employer printer’s clients, the acquiring corporations, by misusing their information for 
his personal trading gain. Id. The Court declined to affirm the conviction on this basis 
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The dissent, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justice 
Marshall, squarely championed a contrary vision for the marketplace and 
sharply disagreed that the “failure to disclose violates the Rule [10b-5] 
only when the responsibilities of a [fiduciary-like] relationship . . . have 
been breached.”98 Blackmun noted that the “common law of actionable 
misrepresentation long has treated the possession of ‘special facts’ as a 
key ingredient in the duty to disclose,”99 and that in fact, “there has been 
a trend away from strict adherence to the harsh maxim caveat emptor and 
toward a more flexible, less formalistic understanding of the duty to 
disclose.”100 Emphasizing the need for “fairness” in market interactions, 
he noted that the Court previously “observed that the securities laws were 
not intended to replicate the law of fiduciary relations[,]”101 and that, 
instead, “their purpose is to ensure the fair and honest functioning of 
impersonal national securities markets where common-law protections 
have proved inadequate.”102 He cited to an opinion he had authored for 
the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,103 which he 
“believe[d], and surely thought, [recognized and approved] . . . this broad 
understanding of the duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5 . . . .”104 
Arguing for information parity, Blackmun continued: “[a]s I now 
read my opinion,” it “lends strong support to the principle that a structural 
disparity in access to material information is a critical factor under Rule 
10b-5 in establishing a duty either to disclose the information or to abstain 
from trading.”105 Blackmun also cited to section 10(b)’s legislative history 
for the proposition that “Congress itself has recognized [that] it is integral 
to this purpose ‘to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without 
undue preferences or advantages among investors.’”106 Blackmun then 
                                                                                                                 
because that theory had not been offered during jury instructions at trial. Id. at 236. This 
theory has come to be known as the misappropriation theory, which the Court would not 
adopt until United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) discussed infra pp. 45–51. 
 98. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 247–48 (citing W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 
15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31 (1936)). 
 101. Id. at 248 (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–76 
(1977)). 
 102. Id. (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979)). 
 103. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
 104. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 250. 
 105. Id. at 251. 
 106. Id. at 248 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94–229, at p. 91, (1975), as reprinted in 
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N, p. 323). 
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cited to Cady, Roberts & Co., describing its import in a more 
straightforward fashion than the majority had.107 Quoting in full the two 
factors that “defined the category of ‘insiders’ subject to a disclose-or-
abstain obligation,” Blackmun concluded that the SEC was focused on 
“access to nonpublic information, and not merely in terms of the presence 
of a common-law fiduciary duty or the like.”108 In the SEC’s view, the 
“duty to abstain or disclose arose, not merely as an incident of fiduciary 
responsibility, but as a result of the ‘inherent unfairness’ of turning secret 
information to account for personal profit.”109 
The dissent concluded that Chiarella was guilty of insider trading 
because “[h]e occupied a relationship to the takeover companies giving 
him intimate access to concededly material information that was 
sedulously guarded from public access . . . . By any reasonable definition, 
his trading was ‘inherent[ly] unfai[r].’”110 
While Powell’s majority opinion took pains to respond to many of 
the dissent’s objections, it did not address Blackmun’s most basic claim, 
which is that section 10(b) should be enforced to ensure fair access to 
information—a position that has been embraced by the SEC and the 
Second Circuit.111 It would not be until Dirks v. SEC that Powell took this 
fundamental disagreement on squarely. 
a.  Government’s Resistance to Chiarella 
Not surprisingly, Chiarella drew sharp scholarly criticism for its 
internal analytic inconsistencies.112 Moreover, the SEC did not relent in 
its effort to enforce its own conflicting vision for how to regulate the 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. at 249. 
 108. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 252. 
 111. See id. (Compare Powell, J., Majority at 224–37 with Blackmun, J., dissenting 
at 246–52). 
 112. See, e.g., Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 341, 376–77 (1982) (“The Court appears simply to be playing games 
with doctrine in order to limit liability without articulating the reasons why liability 
should be limited in just that way. This is not a Supreme Court construing a complicated 
federal statutory scheme with wisdom, craft, and candor; this is a first-year Torts class 
on a bad day.”). 
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securities market.113 The SEC’s next chance to convince the Court of its 
wisdom came only three years later in Dirks v. SEC114 
Its pursuit of Dirks had actually begun in 1973, long before Chiarella 
was decided.115 Dirks was employed by a broker-dealer that provided 
investment analysis to institutional investors.116 He caused his clients to 
trade on MNPI that Ronald Secrist, a former insider at a company called 
Equity Funding, tipped to Dirks.117 Secrist was apparently motivated to 
provide Dirks this information to help expose a fraud that Secrist believed 
was occurring at his company.118 In other words, Secrist did not tip Dirks 
expecting any personal benefit in return. 
Nevertheless, the SEC pursued Dirks in an administrative 
proceeding on the theory that he had engaged in a form of insider trading 
as a tippee of Secrist’s improper disclosure of MNPI.119 For the regulator, 
it was as if Chiarella’s fiduciary duty element was an annoying 
inconvenience, readily ignored.120 The SEC prevailed before the 
administrative judge and then again before the Commission itself.121 
Dirks appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals but lost there as 
well.122 
In affirming the judgment, the D.C. Circuit struggled to distinguish 
Chiarella. Among other arguments, the court appeared to make a 
distinction between “market information” and “inside information,”123 
and then suggested that Chiarella should be applied only to “market 
information” fraud: “the narrowness of the holding in Chiarella cautions 
against applying the majority’s rationale rigidly or exclusively to contexts 
involving information other than ‘market’ information.”124 The Circuit 
Court also held, contrary to the thrust of Chiarella, that “[t]he Chiarella 
majority focused on the existence of a set of fiduciary obligations as a 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 648, 650–51. 
 116. See id. at 648. 
 117. See id. at 649. 
 118. Cf. id. 
 119. See id. at 650–51. 
 120. Cf. id. at 651–52. 
 121. See id. at 650. 
 122. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dismissing petition), rev’d, 463 
U.S. 646 (1983). 
 123. Id. at 835. 
 124. Id. at 837. 
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prerequisite to the addition of a disclosure-or-refrain duty, but it did not 
hold that breach of the fiduciary obligations was required to bring Rule 
10b-5 to bear on a case, nor did it hold that state fiduciary law was the 
sole source of the duty to disclose-or-refrain.”125 
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the SEC, as the agency is 
“charged with administering the nation’s securities laws . . . . It has 
decided to censure Dirks under Rule 10b-5, and we cannot say that the 
SEC’s disposition is ‘inconsistent with the statutory mandate’ behind 
Rule 10b-5 or that it ‘frustrate(s) the policy that Congress sought to 
implement.’”126 
3. Dirks’ “Safe Harbor” for Institutional Analysts 
The Supreme Court promptly reversed, with Justice Powell once 
again writing for the majority.127 The Court again rejected the information 
parity goal underlying the SEC’s position because it “differs little from 
the view that we rejected as inconsistent with congressional intent in 
Chiarella . . . .128 In effect, the SEC’s theory of tippee liability in both 
cases appears rooted in the idea that the anti-fraud provisions require 
equal information among all traders. This conflicts with the principle set 
forth in Chiarella that only some persons, under some circumstances, will 
be barred from trading while in possession of material nonpublic 
information.”129 Citing Chiarella, the Court held “[w]e reaffirm today that 
‘[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties . . . and 
not merely from one’s ability to acquire information because of his 
position in the market.’”130 
Crucially, the Court explained why the idea of “equal information 
among traders” could not form the basis of insider trading law: 
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider 
and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of 
market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the 
preservation of a healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to 
“ferret out and analyze information,” 21 SEC [Docket 1401], at 1406 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 838–39. 
 126. Id. at 839–40 (citations omitted). 
 127. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648, 667 (1983). 
 128. Id. at 656. 
 129. Id. at 657 (footnote omitted). 
 130. Id. at 657–58 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231–32, n.14). 
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[1981], and this often is done by meeting with and questioning 
corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that 
the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the 
market worth of a corporation’s securities. The analyst’s judgment in 
this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients 
of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of 
the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made 
simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the 
public generally.131 
Put another way, demand for information parity is, first, not realistic 
in an industry where investment professionals are expected to “ferret out” 
information that is not readily accessible to the public. Second, it would 
undermine the critical role that such professionals play to the health of the 
capital markets.132 
On this latter point, the Court used the SEC’s own discussions about 
market efficiency to underscore the need to avoid chilling analyst 
activities.133 “The SEC expressly recognized that ‘[t]he value to the entire 
market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in 
pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and 
analyze information, and thus the analyst’s work redounds to the benefit 
of all investors.’”134 Moreover, responding to the SEC’s contention that 
their enforcement action would not impinge on the analysts’ lawful 
activities because they would “remain free to obtain from management 
corporate information for purposes of filling in the ‘interstices in 
analysis,’”135 the Court stated: 
But this rule is inherently imprecise, and imprecision prevents parties 
from ordering their actions in accord with legal requirements. Unless 
the parties have some guidance as to where the line is between 
permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate 
insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is crossed.136 
This was a critical concern for Justice Powell.137 As Professor 
Pritchard reports, “Powell . . . worried that regulation could impair market 
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 136. Id. (citation omitted). 
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efficiency. He saw the SEC’s efforts to impose a ‘parity of information’ 
rule as undermining ‘incentives to perform market research in order to 
discover undervalued stocks and thereby bring about a more efficient 
allocation of resources.’”138 Powell was concerned that supporting the 
SEC’s position would have the opposite result, “securities analysts will 
be far less liable to ‘ferret out’ information. They will be concerned 
constantly with the uncertainty of lawsuits, with juries determining 
whether the information circulated was confidential and should not have 
been disclosed.”139 Drawing on his substantial prior practice as a 
securities lawyer, Powell described the special access analysts had to 
inside information, including: 
The more difficult type of information gathering—difficult in terms 
of line drawing for our purposes—is where the analysts will visit 
corporate headquarters and confer with senior officers. The analyst is 
likely to be a specialist in the particular business. When he returns to 
his firm, often he will circulate “buy” or “sell” recommendations to 
clients and person[s] whom the firm would like to have as clients. 
These recommendations are backed up by a report on the interview.140 
The line drawing problem is one that impacts directly on both the 
corporate officers and the analysts. Neither can be quite sure when the 
“line” is crossed.141 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. (quoting from bench memorandum to Powell in Chiarella and his 
handwritten notes). 
 139. Id. at 938–39 (quoting Powell’s Memorandum for Conference, Dirks v. SEC, 2–
3 (Mar. 23, 1983)). 
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In short, based on his practical knowledge of the securities market, 
Powell wanted to protect the analyst process of finding nonpublic 
information and to ensure that such players had clear guidance as to where 
the prohibited line of insider trading is drawn. 
The bright line drawn by Dirks was personal benefit: “[insiders are] 
forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using 
undisclosed corporate information to their advantage, but they also may 
not give such information to an outsider for the same improper purpose 
of exploiting the information for their personal gain.”142 As for the tippee, 
like Dirks, he “assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a 
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the 
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing 
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that 
there has been a breach.”143 And how would the tippee know there has 
been a breach? “[T]he test is whether the insider personally will benefit, 
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, 
there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by 
the insider, there is no derivative breach [by the tippee].”144 
This significantly narrowed the reach of insider trading, in favor of 
more robust analyst research.145 In Chiarella, the Court had referred to 
personal benefit as an evil that would be prevented by enforcing the 
disclose or abstain rule: “[a]pplication of a duty to disclose prior to trading 
guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the 
shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not benefit personally 
through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.”146 But under 
Dirks, personal benefit became itself an element necessary to finding 
breach of duty.147 
In response to the SEC’s argument that any rule premised on the 
“purpose” of the insider in disclosing the information would lead to 
difficulty in prosecutions, the Court said: “the SEC and the courts are not 
required to read the parties’ minds.”148 Instead, it should look for 
“objective criteria”: 
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[T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the 
insider. This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether 
the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the 
disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings . . . . There are objective facts and 
circumstances that often justify such an inference. For example, there 
may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient that 
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the 
particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation 
of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and 
trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the 
profits to the recipient. 149 
Applying this reasoning, the Court concluded that Dirks did not 
violate the insider trading law.150 He had no relationship to the company 
whose shares were traded by Dirks’ customers.151 And the insiders, Secrist 
and others, did not tip the corporate information for “monetary or personal 
benefit . . . nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information 
to Dirks.”152 Rather, it was to expose the fraud at the company.153 
In trying to draw as clear a line as possible “for those whose daily 
activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s inside-trading 
rules,”154 Powell’s majority opinion—largely at the urging of Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor—required “objective criteria.”155 But this line was 
blurry at best, as it is unclear exactly what personal benefit means. Indeed, 
the Court acknowledged that “[d]etermining whether an insider 
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personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will 
not always be easy for courts.”156 
Imperfect as it was, the decision clearly was intended to, and did, 
offer institutional analysts—and hence their trading clients—some legal 
protection as they plied their trade in ferreting out even MNPI.157 
Professor Donald Langevoort characterized the decision as providing for 
a “deep safe harbor” for securities analysts,158 while Professor John 
Coffee later said the decision was a “virtual paean” to the work of 
securities analysts and offered them a “Magna Carta.”159 
Justice Blackmun again wrote the dissent, arguing that the Court did 
not offer any guidance at all: “The Court acknowledges the burdens and 
difficulties of this approach, but asserts that a principle is needed to guide 
market participants. I fail to see how the Court’s rule has any practical 
advantage over the SEC’s presumption.” 160 To him, “[i]t makes no 
difference to the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or 
intended to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has 
lost because of the insider’s misuse of nonpublic information.”161 
Unwilling to cede this policy debate, the Dirks majority avidly 
engaged with the dissent as it disputed the idea of any “losses” to the 
informationally disadvantaged trader: 
The dissenting opinion focuses on shareholder “losses,” “injury,” and 
“damages,” but in many cases there may be no clear causal connection 
between inside trading and outsiders’ losses. In one sense, as market 
values fluctuate and investors act on inevitably incomplete or 
incorrect information, there always are winners and losers; but those 
who have “lost” have not necessarily been defrauded. On the other 
hand, inside trading for personal gain is fraudulent, and is a violation 
of the federal securities laws. Thus, there is little legal significance to 
the dissent’s argument that Secrist and Dirks created new “victims” 
by disclosing the information to persons who traded.162 
To this, Justice Blackmun retorted that such a view was: 
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[L]ittle different from the theory that insider trading should be 
permitted because it brings relevant information to the market . . . . 
The Court also seems to embrace a variant of that extreme theory, 
which postulates that insider trading causes no harm at all to those 
who purchase from the insider. Ante, at 666-667, [sic] n. 27. Both the 
theory and its variant sit at the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum 
from the much maligned equality-of-information theory, and never 
have been adopted by Congress or ratified by this Court . . . . The 
theory rejects the existence of any enforceable principle of fairness 
between market participants.163 
Then, sounding more like a congressman than a judge, Justice 
Blackmun concluded that Dirks should be held liable, as “[a]ny other 
result is a disservice to this country’s attempt to provide fair and efficient 
capital markets.164 
Though Blackmun’s preferred approach to demand information 
parity may have been a simpler one to follow, it gave little weight to 
Powell’s concern of avoiding an “inhibiting influence on the role of 
market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the 
preservation of a healthy market.”165 To this, Blackmun dismissively 
responded, “I fail to understand how imposing liability on Dirks will 
affect legitimate insider-analyst contacts.”166 This was a superficial 
response to an important policy concern that Powell had laid out in 
detailed, practical terms. 
Put simply, if institutional analysts could be liable for insider trading 
merely because they passed MNPI on to their investing clients, they will 
naturally fear any contact with corporate representatives. And if that 
happens, their analysis of a company’s true merits will not be reflected in 
the pricing of its stock in the securities market. The way to avoid this 
deleterious impact of an insider trading rule was to require, as an element, 
the exchange of information by the insider for a personal benefit. 
Blackmun may have had no meaningful response to this reasoning 
because he had no empirical basis for challenging Powell’s experienced-
based concerns about how an efficient market works.167 
Blackmun did, however, have his own, common sense-based 
concerns about Powell’s new personal benefit test, and to this, Powell had 
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no response.168 Blackmun accurately exposed a serious flaw in Dirks’s 
analysis: 
The Court does not explain why the benefit Secrist obtained—the 
good feeling of exposing a fraud and his enhanced reputation—is any 
different from the benefit to an insider who gives the information as a 
gift to a friend or relative. Under the Court’s somewhat cynical view, 
gifts involve personal gain. Secrist surely gave Dirks a gift of the 
commissions Dirks made on the deal in order to induce him to 
disseminate the information. The distinction between pure altruism 
and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries; there is no 
reason to believe that courts and administrative law judges will have 
an easier time with it.169 
This criticism was unanswered by the majority, and as we shall see, 
the Second Circuit, in Newman, sought to close this doctrinal gap thirty-
two years later by requiring that even gifts to close friends involve some 
potential substantial benefit to the tipper.170 This effort was later rebuffed 
by the Supreme Court in Salman.171 
a. Dirks’ Fundamental Ambiguity 
The problem, of course, is that neither Justice Powell and his allies 
in the Dirks opinion, nor Justice Blackmun were legislators. Neither side 
had the benefit of congressional hearings to mull over the complex issues 
of economics, market behavior, norms of information flow, speed of 
information getting impounded into stock prices, or the like. What would 
be the true impact on analyst investigative activities if the law contained 
a blanket prohibition on trading on MNPI? Was Powell’s concern 
empirically grounded? And even if it was, did the positives of having a 
personal benefit test outweigh the inherent ambiguities in the law that 
would be invited by that test? No congressional hearings examined these 
important questions. 
Professor Langevoort predicted the significant legal problems that 
might follow.172 Arguably, his prediction was realized in the form of the 
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Newman/Martoma impasse.173 Writing in 1990, Langevoort engaged in a 
detailed analysis of the economic and policy arguments for and against 
the efficient market/information parity debate.174 He then centered in on 
the element of personal benefit that the Dirks Court required before 
finding a breach of fiduciary duty.175 Noting that Dirks’ definition of 
personal benefit included a reputational benefit that will translate into 
future earnings, among others, he asked “what is the difference if the form 
of currency [for an insider to share information to an institutional 
investor] is a favorable analyst’s recommendation instead of cash? Yet 
this seems to be what Dirks permits.”176 
He predicted that a court may later “declar[e] that the Dirks safe-
harbor is available only with respect to unintentional disclosures, such as 
slips of the tongue or good faith misappreciations of materiality, not 
conscious tips. The notion of personal benefit might thereupon grow to 
include all corporate ‘gifts’ of information—any situation where officials 
of the issuer consciously prefer the interests of one group of shareholders 
to another.”177 
But if this were to occur, he predicted, it “would effectively destroy 
the meaningfulness of the personal/business distinction that the Supreme 
Court so clearly considered the linchpin of its analysis. The analyst’s safe-
harbor would accordingly disappear.”178 
Langevoort concluded that, if the courts continue to look favorably 
upon the role of institutional analysts, “there is little reason to expect such 
revisionism will occur beyond the random case.”179 But if courts were to 
“[t]ak[e] a more critical view of the argument for the analyst . . . a 
doctrinal shift would be both foreseeable and unsurprising.”180 
As discussed infra at Part I.A.4, the Newman court can be viewed as 
supporting the role of securities professionals and refusing to accept such 
a radical “revisionism” of Dirks, thus keeping the safe harbor intact, while 
the Martoma majority can be viewed as taking the opposite view, all but 
ensuring the “doctrinal shift” that Langevoort considered to be “both 
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foreseeable and unsurprising.”181 The Martoma majority appears to accept 
the idea that breaches of fiduciary duty “include all corporate ‘gifts’ of 
information-any situation where officials of the issuer consciously prefer 
the interests of one group of shareholders to another.”182 The safe-harbor 
“accordingly disappear[s].”183 
The SEC and federal prosecutors inexorably pushed the law to that 
position.184 Indeed, after the Dirks decision, its former Chairman declared, 
“[t]he fact is that the SEC does not accept Dirks.”185 This would have been 
the time for the Commission to seek a legislative response, overruling the 
decision.186 Instead, the SEC actually persuaded Congress not to pass 
legislation.187 It was more focused on protecting its flexibility in policing 
the securities market.188 Perhaps it was also concerned that Congress may 
agree with Justice Powell when all relevant information about the 
workings of the securities market were duly considered. Whatever its 
strategy, the SEC chose instead to continue to prosecute individuals with 
expanding theories on a case-by-case basis.189 In so doing, the 
Government often found a supportive audience in the Second Circuit. 
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4. The Misappropriation Theory—Government’s Continued Expansion  
of the Law in the Second Circuit 
One promising avenue of expansion that the SEC and criminal 
authorities pursued was the theory of misappropriation. As early as 
Chiarella, the Justices’ multiple opinions had presaged a theory that if 
someone takes confidential information belonging to someone else, 
without the owner’s consent, the misappropriator may not use that 
information for personal gain.190 Chiarella, the printing company’s 
employee, took corporate information that had been entrusted to the 
company and used it to trade in the corporate client’s stock for personal 
profit.191 The jury in that case had not been instructed about a theory of 
misuse of stolen information, and thus the conviction could not be 
affirmed on that basis.192 But both Justice Stevens’ concurring and Justice 
Burger’s dissenting opinions noted the possibility of basing a conviction 
on such a theory.193 
One year after Chiarella—but before Dirks—the Second Circuit 
embraced the misappropriation theory in a criminal prosecution captioned 
United States v. Newman (Newman I).194 The Court noted Justice Stevens’ 
concurring opinion in Chiarella reserving this issue “for another day,” 
then said, “[f]or this Court, that day has now come.”195 Newman was a 
trader at a brokerage firm who received MNPI about proposed mergers 
and acquisitions from two employees of investment banks.196 He caused 
his associates at foreign locations to use secret bank and trust accounts to 
effectuate trading on the information, reaping substantial profits.197 
Newman then shared the profits with the investment bank insiders.198 
They were charged under section 10(b) on a misappropriation theory, as 
well as under the separate mail and wire fraud statutes.199 
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The district court, however, dismissed the charges on the basis that 
securities law prior to the charged conduct was insufficiently clear and 
that the mail fraud allegations failed as a matter of law.200 In reversing, 
the majority held that Newman’s “conduct as alleged in the indictment 
could be found to constitute a criminal violation of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 despite the fact that neither [of the investment banks] nor their 
clients was at the time a purchaser or seller of the target company 
securities in any transaction with any of the defendants.”201 
The majority canvassed the state of securities law—largely in the 
civil context—but made almost no effort to address the limitations of the 
law described in the Chiarella decision.202 Instead, the majority cited 
to the dissenting opinions, including Chief Justice Burger’s 
statement that Chiarella “misappropriated—stole to put it 
bluntly—valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in 
the utmost confidence.”203 For the Newman I majority, “[t]hat 
characterization aptly describes the conduct of the connivers in 
the instant case.”204 
Judge Dumbauld dissented from this portion of the opinion, noting 
that Chiarella and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores “evince a 
trend to confine the scope of [section] 10(b) to practices harmful to 
participants in actual purchase-sale transactions.”205 He noted that Justice 
Stevens’s concurring view was merely that “respectable arguments could 
be made in support of either position.”206 Judge Dumbauld would have 
reversed on the more limited and “solid ground that [defendant] has 
clearly violated the Mail Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. [section] 1341.”207 
If there was any doubt as to how the Second Circuit would have come 
out had Newman I been decided after the Dirks decision in 1983, the Court 
put it to rest in SEC v. Materia.208 There, just a little over a year after 
Dirks, a unanimous panel of Second Circuit judges again applied the 
misappropriation theory to affirm the district court’s finding of liability 
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against the defendant.209 Like Chiarella, Materia had been an employee at 
a printing company who had determined the identity of target companies 
and traded in those companies.210 This time, the SEC squarely presented 
the misappropriation theory to the court, and the Second Circuit had no 
problem concluding that the defendant’s conduct violated section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act.211 Materia defrauded his employer “[b]y purloining 
and trading on confidences entrusted to Bowne [his employer, and 
thereby] . . . undermined his employer’s integrity.”212 
In so holding, the court gave no attention to the limiting language of 
Chiarella or Dirks.213 Indeed, it did not even acknowledge Dirks.214 It 
cited to Chiarella for the limited purpose of quoting the same 
“misappropriated—stole to put it bluntly” language from Justice Burger’s 
dissent that the Newman court had quoted215 and to note that the 
misappropriation theory had not been “disavow[ed]” by Chiarella.216 
Commentators were divided on the soundness of the 
misappropriation theory. Professor Barbara Aldave argued that neither 
Chiarella nor Dirks provided a satisfactory explanation for why Rule 10b-
5 prohibits insider trading, and that misappropriation was a better 
conceptual basis for the prohibition.217 Others argued that the theory ran 
directly counter to the limitations set by Dirks and in any event did not 
make sense since “[t]he employee’s duty to his employer, . . . has nothing 
to do with a duty to speak. . . . Disclosure by the employee would 
aggravate the breach of duty to the employer, not cure it.”218 
In the meantime, the Second Circuit continued to cement the 
misappropriation theory into insider trading law with ever expanding 
reach. In United States v. Carpenter,219 the Court affirmed the conviction 
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of a Wall Street Journal (“WSJ”) reporter, a former clerk, and a 
stockbroker, who traded ahead of upcoming, highly influential news 
articles issued by the WSJ about company performance.220 Relying on 
Dirks, the defendants argued that “the misappropriation theory may be 
applied only where the information is misappropriated by corporate 
insiders or so-called quasi-insiders, who owe to the corporation and its 
shareholders a fiduciary duty of abstention or disclosure.”221 The Court 
rejected the argument because, in Materia, it had applied the 
misappropriation theory to “proscribe[] the conversion by ‘insiders’ or 
others of material non-public information in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities.”222 
In his dissent, Judge Miner expressed two concerns about the 
majority’s application of the misappropriation theory.223 First, unlike 
prior cases, this one involved the use of journal articles rather than insider 
“securities-related information by those who obtain that information 
through special relationships with their sources of knowledge.”224 Second, 
the harm to the owner of the information, the WSJ, was tenuous: “[w]hile 
the proscription of fraudulent and deceptive practices in connection with 
the purchase and sale of securities is a broad one, it never was intended to 
protect the reputation, or enforce the ethical standards, of a financial 
newspaper.”225 
As one commentator observed, even before the Carpenter decision, 
the misappropriation theory “entirely ignores the tippee liability test 
articulated by Dirks which requires that an insider receive some personal 
benefit from the disclosure of inside information to a tippee.”226 
Carpenter’s material expansion of that theory to conduct where the 
corporate insider is nowhere in sight fell even farther from the Dirks test. 
5. Carpenter—An Impasse as Powell Departs the Bench 
But for fortuitous timing, the misappropriation theory would have 
likely been rejected. Justice Powell, however, retired before the appeal 
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could be heard.227 Professor Pritchard reports that the Court initially voted 
to deny the defendants’ petition for certiorari, and Powell drafted a 
dissent from the denial, “ma[king] it clear that he would have rejected the 
misappropriation theory altogether” because it conflicted with the Court’s 
insider trading decisions.228 
Under Chiarella, Powell argued, “liability is premised upon a duty 
to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction.”229 In Dirks, as well, “the relevant disclosure duty 
was between the parties to the securities transaction.”230 In Carpenter, 
there was no fiduciary relationship between the defendants and those who 
had sold them securities.231 Because “the inquiry under Rule 10b-5 ‘must 
focus on the petitioner’s relationship with the sellers of . . . securities,’ 
and because there was no such relationship, Powell concluded that the 
petitioners’ conduct did not violate Rule 10b-5.”232 
This dissent was never published because the Court ultimately 
agreed to grant certiorari.233 With Powell’s retirement and his successor, 
Anthony Kennedy, not confirmed until after the argument,234 the “Court 
split 4-4 on the misappropriation theory, automatically affirming the 
conviction as a consequence.”235 As Professor Pritchard predicted: 
“[g]iven Powell’s rejection of the misappropriation theory in his draft 
dissent, it is reasonable to conclude that if Powell had not retired when he 
did, the Supreme Court would have rejected the misappropriation theory 
in 1987.”236 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Pritchard, supra note 67, at 945. 
 228. Id. at 943–44. 
 229. Id. at 944. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. 
 232. Pritchard, supra note 67, at 945. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. As to the second basis for conviction—the mail and wire fraud statutes under 
Title 18—the Court overwhelmingly affirmed the conviction, as it accepted the theory 
that the defendants had deprived the Wall Street Journal of “its right to exclusive use of 
the information, for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business 
information and most private property for that matter.” Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25–28. 
 236. Pritchard, supra note 67, at 945. 
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6. Chestman—A Splintered Second Circuit 
Notwithstanding its considerable tension with Chiarella and Dirks, 
the misappropriation theory was pursued aggressively by the SEC and 
criminal authorities, and the lower courts largely supported their 
efforts.237 A rare but limited setback for the Government in the Second 
Circuit occurred in United States v. Chestman,238 when the court, sitting 
en banc, reversed the conviction of a defendant charged with 
misappropriation among other charges.239 
The case, which yielded seven separate conflicting opinions,240 
illustrates how deeply mired in doctrinal uncertainty the law had become 
in just over a decade. It also demonstrated how the SEC and the 
Government’s unabated efforts to impose information parity on the 
marketplace, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s twice rejection of that 
policy, embroiled lower courts in conflicting views about the law of 
insider trading. 
In Chestman, a corporate insider of Waldbaum, Inc. was a 
Waldbaum family member who told his sister and other immediate family 
members about plans to make a tender offer to another large company.241 
The sister told her daughter, Susan Loeb, who in turn told her husband, 
Keith Loeb.242 Loeb then tipped his stockbroker, Robert Chestman.243 
Chestman used that information to buy stock for himself and his clients—
including Loeb—and sold the shares at a profit after the takeover became 
public.244 Chestman was charged with fraudulent trading in connection 
with a tender offer in violation of Rule 14e–3(a), securities fraud in 
violation of Rule 10b-5 under a misappropriation theory, mail fraud, and 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading, supra note 36, at 1173–75 
(collecting cases) (“Second Circuit courts continued to apply the misappropriation theory 
in the context of employment relationships and other settings . . . . In addition to the 
influential Second Circuit, courts in other jurisdictions, including the Third, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits, followed suit.”). 
 238. United States v. Chestman (Chestman II), 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc 
panel, yielding four separate opinions), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992). 
 239. Id. at 551. 
 240. United States v. Chestman (Chestman I), 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (original 
panel, yielding three separate opinions); Chestman II, 947 F.2d at 551. 
 241. Chestman I, 903 F.2d at 77. 
 242. Id. at 77. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Chestman II, 947 F.2d at 555–56. 
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one count of perjury in connection with his testimony before the SEC.245 
“After a jury trial, Chestman was convicted on all counts.”246 
In his original appeal to the Second Circuit, the Court reversed the 
convictions.247 It was unanimous in reversing the conviction as to the 10b-
5 and perjury counts,248 but split on the Rule 14e-3(a) conviction, with a 
majority voting—in two separate opinions—to reverse that conviction on 
the basis that the SEC did not have authority to issue that rule.249 The 
Court then granted the Government’s application for en banc review.250 
The dispute in the resulting four opinions centered—as it would again in 
Newman/Martoma, decades later—on what exactly constitutes insider 
trading.251 
Dealing first with Rule 14e-3(a), the Court noted that it was 
promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 14(e),252 and essentially 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. at 551. 
 246. Id. at 556. 
 247. Id. at 551. 
 248. Chestman I, 903 F.2d at 82, 84. 
 249. Id. at 84–88. 
 250. See United States v. Chestman, 1990 WL 134249 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 1990). 
 251. Chestman II, 947 F.2d 551–52. 
 252. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012). Section 14(e) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any 
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of 
security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, 
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this 
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means 
reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are 
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. 
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012). Congress enacted Section 14(e) as part of the Williams Act, 
Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). Pursuant to the authority granted by section 
14(e), the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3 in 1980. Rule 14e-3(a) provides: 
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has 
commenced, a tender offer (the “offering person”), it shall constitute 
a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the 
meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in 
possession of material information relating to such tender offer which 
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precludes any trading on MNPI in connection with a tender offer, without 
regard to whether the insider breached any fiduciary duty.253 Once it was 
established that Chestman knew the tip about a tender offer he received 
was MNPI, he was required to disclose or abstain from trading. In 
challenging his conviction on this count, Chestman argued that, under 
Chiarella, the Commission did not have the power to define fraud without 
also requiring breach of duty.254 Two members of the original Second 
Circuit panel to hear his appeal had agreed with him and voted to reverse 
the section 14(e) conviction.255 Nevertheless, applying Chevron deference 
to an agency’s determination,256 the majority of the en banc panel rejected 
the challenge on the basis that the language and legislative history of 
Section 14(e) was materially different from that of section 10(b) and that 
the SEC had authority to issue a broad prohibition in the tender offer 
context, one that “deserves special regulation.”257 Thus, Chestman’s 
                                                                                                                 
information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which 
he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or 
indirectly from: 
(1) The offering person, 
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such 
tender offer, or 
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other 
person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, 
to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of 
such securities or any securities convertible into or 
exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right 
to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, 
unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale 
such information and its source are publicly disclosed by 
press release or otherwise. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e–3(a) (2019). 
 253. Chestman II, 947 F.2d at 557. 
 254. Id. at 556. 
 255. Chestman I, 903 F.2d at 84–88. 
 256. Chestman II, 947 F.2d at 557 (“In reviewing this claim, our scope of review is 
limited.”) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)). 
 257. Id. at 560 (unlike the general anti-fraud provision of section 10(b), “section 14(e) 
is an anti-fraud provision specifically tailored to the field of tender offers, an area of the 
securities industry that, the Williams Act makes clear, deserves special regulation.”). 
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convictions on the Rule 14e charges were affirmed, vacating the original 
panel’s reversal of those convictions.258 
Judge Mahoney wrote a comprehensive dissent, arguing that the 
SEC’s effort to excise the fiduciary duty element from insider trading 
prosecutions contravened the Supreme Court’s rulings in Chiarella and 
Dirks.259 In his view, this was “an obvious effort by the SEC to 
circumvent” Chiarella,260 and the rule was designed “to avoid the impact 
of Dirks.”261 Judge Mahoney doubted the SEC’s authority “to impose a 
limited equal-access rule in the aftermath of Chiarella [and] Dirks.”262 
The Government’s victory, however, was only partial. With respect 
to the misappropriation counts of conviction under Rule 10b-5, the 
majority concluded that the Government had failed to prove any breach 
of “a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence” by Keith 
Loeb “owed to the Waldbaum family or [his wife].”263 The Court began 
by painstakingly retracing the history of insider trading law.264 It 
identified the “Traditional Theory of Rule 10b-5 Liability,” stemming 
from Chiarella and Dirks, pursuant to which a person possessing MNPI 
owes a duty “to disclose or abstain” from trading and that this duty arises 
                                                                                                                 
The Court also noted that section 14(e) was part of the Williams Act, whose “sole purpose 
. . . was the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer.” Id. at 558–
59 (quoting Piper v. Chris–Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977)). Moreover, section 
14(e) expressly directed the SEC to “define” fraudulent practices and to “prescribe means 
reasonably designed to prevent” such practices. Id. at 558. 
  The legislative history also shows that the SEC specifically identified for the 
legislators the danger of trading by the “person who has become aware that a tender bid 
is to be made . . . [who] may fail to disclose material facts with respect thereto to persons 
who sell to him securities for which the tender bid is to be made.” Id. at 559 (quoting 
from Hearings on S.3431 before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate S. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, 12 (1970)). Thus, the Court concluded: 
“Recognizing the highly sensitive nature of tender offer information, its susceptibility to 
misuse, and the often-difficult task of ferreting out and proving fraud, Congress sensibly 
delegated to the SEC broad authority to delineate a penumbra around the fuzzy subject 
of tender offer fraud.” Id. at 559. 
 258. Id. at 571. 
 259. Id. at 583–84. 
 260. See id. at 587 (Mahoney, J., dissenting). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 586 (citing to and quoting from American Bar Association Committee on 
Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider 
Trading, 41 BUS. LAW. 223, 252 (1985)). 
 263. Id. at 564. 
 264. Id. 
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only from a fiduciary or other similar relationship of trust and confidence 
between the parties to the transaction.265 The Supreme Court “rejected a 
parity of information theory of Rule 10b-5 liability,” requiring instead “a 
specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual trading 
on inside information.”266 
The Court then described the rise of the “Misappropriation Theory,” 
which it called the “second general theory of Rule 10b-5 liability,”267 one 
that had not yet been adopted by the Supreme Court but accepted by 
several Circuit Courts, including the Second Circuit.268 “Under this 
theory, a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates material 
nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship 
of trust and confidence and uses that information in a securities 
transaction.”269 Here, the victim is not the buyer or seller of securities, but 
rather “the source of the nonpublic information, even though the source 
may be unaffiliated with the buyer or seller of securities.”270 The Court 
called this a “fraud-on-the-source” theory.271 
The Court then turned to the question presented by the Government’s 
newly evolved iteration of insider trading law: how does the breach of 
duty element apply in a family setting. The Court engaged in a detailed 
review of fiduciary law, including in the context of family relationships, 
as well as the question of what is meant by a “similar relationship of trust 
and confidence.”272 The Court held that such a relationship “must be the 
functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.”273 That meant having 
elements of reliance on one side and “de facto control and dominance” or 
“superiority and influence on the other.”274 The test, then, was 
“dependency and influence.”275 Applying the dependency-influence test 
to the evidence adduced against Chestman, the Court concluded that “the 
evidence [did] not support a finding that Keith Loeb shared either a 
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fiduciary relation or its functional equivalent.”276 His wife’s “disclosure . 
. . served no [business] purpose” and she simply gave him the information 
“unprompted.”277 As Loeb breached no fiduciary duty, Chestman “could 
not be derivatively liable”.278 
Judge Ralph Winter issued an opinion, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, which was joined by a number of his colleagues.279 If 
the majority’s review of the evolution of insider trading law was detailed, 
it paled in comparison to the archeology Judge Winter performed, as he 
explained “[t]he difficulty this court finds in resolving the issues raised 
by this appeal stems largely from the history of the development of the 
law concerning insider trading.280 For that reason, I begin by tracing that 
history in [a] somewhat tiresome fashion.”281 
Judge Winter then set about describing the many problems with the 
law.282 He started with the observation that the law is “based solely on 
administrative and judicial caselaw. This caselaw establishes that some 
trading on material nonpublic information is illegal and some is not. The 
line between the two is less than clear.”283 He labeled Chiarella “an 
enigma” in that “[i]t appears to state that [s]ection 10(b) bars some kinds 
of insider trading. However, it rejects the element of Cady, Roberts & Co. 
that provided the fraud or deception linking the conduct to the provisions 
of [s]ection 10(b).”284 As to Dirks, Judge Winter opined that “the Court’s 
rationale is obscure, and, as a result, so is the scope of the rule.”285 Yet, 
“[n]otwithstanding the ambiguities surrounding [s]ection 10(b)’s impact 
on insider trading—including its very definition—Congress has increased 
the penalties for violations of that prohibition. . . . The SEC in turn has 
failed to promulgate rules outside the area of tender offers but its 
decisions have continued to march, in the eyes of one commentator, to the 
beat of its own drummer.”286 Under these circumstances, Judge Winter 
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noted “[i]t is hardly surprising that disagreement exists within an en banc 
court of appeals as to the import of present caselaw.”287 
With palpable reluctance, Judge Winter nevertheless proceeded to 
analyze the facts against the hazy doctrine of insider trading, noting that 
“the law is far enough down this road—indeed, the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act seems premised on [s]ection 10(b)’s applicability—that a 
court of appeals has no option but to continue the route.”288 
His disagreement with the majority regarding Loeb’s relationship to 
his wife and her family members was largely practical, and he would have 
found a breach of duty because Waldbaum Inc. was a family-controlled 
business.289 Acknowledging “the difficulty of drawing lines in this 
area,”290 he would have found that a “family member in possession of 
“confidential corporate information through ordinary family interactions, 
and . . . who knows that under the circumstances both the corporation and 
the family desire confidentiality, has a duty not to use information so 
obtained for personal profit where the use risks disclosure.”291 Under this 
test, Judge Winter concluded that Loeb breached his duty and that 
“Chestman knew” that.292 
Judge Miner agreed entirely with the majority opinion but issued his 
own concurring opinion, to respond expressly to Judge Winter’s dissent 
on the scope of the misappropriation theory, which he called the “‘familial 
relationship’ rule of insider trading.”293 Concerned that the Government 
may seek to utilize the concept in future prosecutions, Judge Miner 
warned “[t]he difficulty of identifying those who would be covered by the 
proposed familial rule adds an additional element of uncertainty to what 
already are uncertain crimes.”294 He worried that “[t]he net would be 
spread wider than appropriate in a criminal context”295 and that “to further 
extend the concept of confidential duty would be to take the courts into 
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an area of securities regulation not yet entered by Congress. It would give 
the wrong signal to prosecutors in their continuing efforts to push against 
existing boundaries in the prosecution of securities fraud cases.”296 Judge 
Miner suggested “await[ing] further instructions from Congress before 
sailing into this unchartered area.”297 
Almost two decades later, Congress has offered nothing of the kind. 
Instead, nine years after Chestman, the SEC took it upon itself to shore 
up the gap identified by the Court to issue a new rule, Rule 10b5-2, 
imposing a duty of trust or confidence between spouses, parent and their 
children, and siblings when they share MNPI.298 
7. O’Hagan and the Misappropriation Theory 
Judge Winter’s misgivings about the origin and evolution of the law 
and Judge Miner’s plea that the courts await congressional action had no 
discernible impact on the Government as it continued its push for 
expansion of the law. Its next significant opportunity came in United 
States v. O’Hagan.299 Ten years after its deadlock in Carpenter, the 
Supreme Court was presented once again with the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading.300 This time—with Justice Powell long since 
retired from the bench—the Court approved the theory, but not without 
drawing a penetrating dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.301 
Unlike Secrist, the insider in Dirks who was motivated by a 
conscientious desire to expose fraud—O’Hagan—was a defendant whom 
the Government could easily portray as a greedy lawyer who violated the 
duties of client confidentiality for personal gain. Yet, it bears noting that 
even here the Eighth Circuit found the defendant’s conduct not criminal. 
O’Hagan was a partner at the law firm Dorsey & Whitney.302 The 
firm was engaged for a brief period by Grand Metropolitan PLC (“Grand 
Met”) in connection with a potential tender offer for the Pillsbury 
Company’s common stock.303 O’Hagan was not involved in the 
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engagement but learned of it and decided to buy call options for, as well 
as shares in, Pillsbury stock.304 “When Grand Met [later] announced its 
tender offer, . . . the price of Pillsbury stock rose [and] O’Hagan sold his 
Pillsbury call options and common stock, making a profit of more than 
$4.3 million.”305 He was later criminally charged under both [section] 
10(b) and § 14(e) of the Exchange Act.306 
As in Chestman, the two core issues before the Court were the 
viability of the misappropriation theory and the SEC’s authority to issue 
Rule 14e–3(a).307 As to the first issue, the Court adopted the 
misappropriation theory pressed by the Government: 
[A] fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s 
information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty 
and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that 
information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship 
between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s 
stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-
turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to 
confidential information.308 
The Court noted that section 10(b) “requires deception ‘in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not deception of an 
identifiable purchaser or seller.”309 Thus, according to the Court, it should 
not matter that the deception or fraud was perpetrated on the client 
company, Grand Met, while the party that traded with O’Hagan was a 
shareholder of Pillsbury.310 
In so holding, the Court made an observation that pulled in a policy 
direction away from Chiarella/Dirks’s rejection of information parity, as 
it declared: “an animating purpose of the Exchange Act [was] to insure 
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”311 
While acknowledging that “informational disparity is inevitable in the 
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securities markets,” the Court embraced the view that any such disparity 
must be the product of “luck,” “research or skill,” not “contrivance.”312 
Section 10(b), however, requires not only fraud, but fraud “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” and on this point, 
the Court concluded that “the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when 
the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without 
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell 
securities.313 The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus 
coincide.”314 
Three Justices disagreed and instead sided with the majority of 
judges in the Eighth Circuit panel, that O’Hagan should not be held 
criminally liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.315 In their view, 
because the fraud or deception had to be “in connection with” a securities 
transaction, the fraud has to be perpetrated on the investors with whom 
one trades.316 Here, O’Hagan misappropriated or “defrauded” Grand Met, 
the potential acquirer, rather than the shareholders of Pillsbury, the 
acquisition target.317 Justice Scalia believed “the principle of lenity we 
apply to criminal statutes” should lead to the conclusion that “the 
unelaborated statutory language: ‘[t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance,’ [section] 10(b), must be construed to require the 
manipulation or deception of a party to a securities transaction,” i.e., 
Pillsbury stock transactions.318 
In Justice Thomas’s dissent—where he was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist—there was no need to resort to the rule of lenity; the language 
of the statute was plain enough: “I cannot accept the Commission’s 
interpretation of when a deceptive device is ‘use[d] . . . in connection 
                                                                                                                 
 312. Id. at 658–59. While the distinction is intuitively appealing, on closer 
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with’ a securities transaction.”319 As he explained, if O’Hagan had stolen 
money rather than information from company A and used it to trade with 
company B, even the SEC agreed that would not be securities fraud. There 
has to be “a more integral connection between the fraud and the securities 
transaction.”320 But if so, what is it? 
The Government argued “that the misappropriation theory satisfies 
the ‘in connection with’ requirement because it ‘depends on an inherent 
connection between the deceptive conduct and the purchase or sale of a 
security.’”321 Recognizing that this may go too far, however, the majority 
did not adopt the reasoning and instead required that the fraudulently-
obtained property is one that “‘misappropriators ordinarily capitalize 
upon to gain no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities.’”322 
Justice Thomas criticized this approach as a judge-imposed 
expansion of the law that had not even been advanced by the Government: 
There are no findings regarding the ‘ordinary’ use of misappropriated 
information much less regarding the ‘ordinary’ use of other forms of 
embezzled property . . . . [P]ersons subject to this new theory, such as 
respondent here, surely could not and cannot regulate their behavior 
to comply with the new theory because, until today, the theory has 
never existed.323 
The dissent also crucially exposed the majority’s effort to protect the 
fairness or integrity of the securities market through a form of information 
parity: 
[T]he supposed threat to fair and honest markets, investor confidence, 
and market integrity comes not from the supposed fraud in this case, 
but from the mere fact that the information used by O’Hagan was 
nonpublic. As the majority concedes, because “the deception essential 
to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source 
of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to 
trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and 
thus no [section] 10(b) violation.” Indeed, were the source expressly 
to authorize its agents to trade on the confidential information—as a 
perk or bonus, perhaps—there would likewise be no [section] 10(b) 
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violation. Yet in either case—disclosed misuse or authorized use—the 
hypothesized “inhibiting impact on market participation,” would be 
identical to that from behavior violating the misappropriation theory: 
“Outsiders” would still be trading based on nonpublic information that 
the average investor has no hope of obtaining through his own 
diligence . . . Even if it is true that trading on nonpublic information 
hurts the public, it is true whether or not there is any deception of the 
source of the information.324 
The dissent went on to remind the parties that, “as we have 
repeatedly held, use of nonpublic information to trade is not itself a 
violation of [section] 10(b).”325 The fraud has to be “in connection with” 
a securities transaction itself.326 
In other words, the harm to the unwitting buyer of Pillsbury stock 
from O’Hagan, resulted from information disparity, not the means by 
which O’Hagan acquired information superiority. The “fraud” on the 
source, Grand Met, could have been remedied by O’Hagan’s disclosure 
to it of his intent to trade Pillsbury stock. That would not remove the harm 
to the Pillsbury shareholders. By tying the fraud to the trade, the majority 
was “[c]onflating causation and correlation.” 327 The use of MNPI, “even 
for securities trading, is not illegal, and the consequential deception of the 
source follows an entirely divergent branch of causation than does the 
harm to the public. The trader thus ‘gains his advantageous market 
position through’ the use of nonpublic information, whether or not 
deception is involved; the deception has no effect on the existence or 
extent of his advantage.” 328 
While one could certainly criticize the dissent for taking an overly 
restrictive reading of the phrase “in connection with,” it is likely Powell 
would have agreed with the dissent’s direction. It sought to contain the 
scope of insider trading laws within the lines drawn by Chiarella/Dirks. 
In contrast, the misappropriation theory was effectively expanding the 
law to protect any shareholder who has unequal information because of a 
violation of some duty somewhere in the extended chain of information 
sharing. Such a theory expanded the zone of danger for an institutional 
investor and would undoubtedly diminish the safe harbor that Dirks 
intended. 
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In also dissenting from the majority’s conclusion that the SEC had 
authority to issue Rule 14e-3(a) respecting tender offers,329 Justice 
Thomas pointed out that Section 14(e), like section 10(b), is addressed to 
fraud, and there was no fraud in the absence of a breach of fiduciary 
duty.330 Citing Chiarella, the dissent again reminded the Government and 
the majority that 
[T]here is no general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information, and such duty only arises from a specific relationship 
between two parties . . . . Unfair disparities in market information, and 
the potential ‘stampede effect’ of leaks, do not necessarily involve a 
breach of any duty to anyone, and thus are not proper objects for 
regulation in the name of ‘fraud’ under [section] 14(e) . . . . As we 
have held in the context of [section] 10(b), not every instance of 
financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity.331 
Professor Carol Swanson claimed the O’Hagan Court “squandered 
a rare chance to clarify one of the most difficult and frustrating topics in 
business law.”332 She accurately predicted that “insider trading regulation 
will struggle forward, ill-defined and inefficient, into the next century.”333 
Noting that “[t]he policy concerns underlying insider trading litigation 
have essentially run between fairness and economic efficiency,” she 
believed the “misappropriation theory itself embodies and heightens these 
tensions as a doctrine not directly supported by statutory language, yet 
born of a desire to regulate traders who benefit more remotely from inside 
information.”334 She lamented that “[b]efore O’Hagan, insider trading 
law was in confused disarray, the misappropriation theory was alive, but 
possessed an ill-defined scope, and an army of commentators demanded 
legislation that would provide clarity and predictability. After O’Hagan, 
the world looks very much the same.”335 
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8. The “Confused Disarray” and the Dilution of the Personal Benefit 
Element 
The years following O’Hagan did not improve the clarity of the law. 
Its “confused disarray” became further baked into the law of insider 
trading, as the Government continued to advocate legal positions in 
pursuit of a more “level playing field” of market information.336 Wittingly 
or not, the Government’s arguments further weakened the connection 
between breach of fiduciary duty and prohibited trading. 
For example, in 1998, the Second Circuit applied Dirks’ “personal 
benefit” test in the context of tipper liability involving two close 
friends.337 In SEC v. Warde,338 an insider—Downe—tipped his close 
friend—Warde—who then traded for a profit.339 There was no evidence 
that Downe received any pecuniary benefit from Warde.340 Applying 
Dirks, however, the Court held that 
the SEC need not show that the tipper expected or received a specific 
or tangible benefit in exchange for the tip . . . . Rather, the ‘benefit’ 
element of [section] 10(b) is satisfied when the tipper ‘intend[s] to 
benefit the . . . recipient’ or ‘makes a gift of confidential information 
to a trading relative or friend.’341 
Thus, Warde’s trades “resemble[d] trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. The close friendship 
between Downe and Warde suggests that Downe’s tip was ‘inten[ded] to 
benefit’ Warde, and therefore allows a jury finding that Downe’s tip 
breached a duty under [section] 10(b).”342 
But what about Warde’s knowledge that Downe violated his 
fiduciary duty? Here, the Court appears to make a subtle but significant 
shift from Dirks that the Newman Court would struggle to undo nearly 
fifteen years later.  In Dirks, the personal benefit element was a condition 
for finding a breach of fiduciary duty; put another way, one violates a 
fiduciary duty when one tips for the purpose of obtaining a personal 
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benefit.343 The Warde Court, however, appeared to decouple personal 
benefit from the breach of fiduciary duty element, with the tippee’s 
knowledge going to the breach of trust and not necessarily knowledge of 
a personal benefit: “[t]o affirm Warde’s liability as a tippee under 
[section] 10(b), we must find sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable 
finding that . . . (4) Warde knew or should have known that Downe 
violated a relationship of trust by relaying Kidde information; and (5) 
Downe benefitted by the disclosure to Warde.”344 Missing was the 
requirement that Warde, the tippee defendant, knew that the insider 
Downe received some benefit from tipping Warde.345 Having found that 
Downe sought to gift information to Warde, the Court determined that 
Warde was liable as a tippee without a separate analysis of whether Warde 
knew that Downes had obtained a personal benefit; it was sufficient that 
Warde knew Downe had violated the company’s confidentiality 
requirement.346 
This distinction was not momentous in Warde because Warde 
presumably would have understood that Downe benefited by gifting 
valuable information to his close friend.347 Yet, the Court’s discussion of 
the elements that effectively decoupled the personal benefit element from 
the fiduciary duty breach would have adverse consequences in subsequent 
cases. 
In United States v. Falcone,348 the Second Circuit affirmed the 
conviction of a second level tippee, Falcone, without commenting on 
whether the Government had proven the tippee knew whether the insider 
had obtained a personal benefit. The Court also approved a 
misappropriation theory against a tippee who traded on misappropriated 
information—unlike O’Hagan, where the temporary insider was himself 
the trader.349 The core issue on appeal was whether O’Hagan precluded 
his conviction on a misappropriation theory because the insider’s act of 
misappropriation was not “in connection with” the securities trading that 
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he, a tippee, subsequently engaged in.350 The Court affirmed the 
conviction, noting that the facts of O’Hagan were not “the sole 
combination of factors necessary to establish the requisite connection in 
all contexts,” and that the Court could apply the broader O’Hagan 
“requirement that the misappropriated information ‘ordinarily’ be 
valuable due to ‘its utility in securities trading,’ . . . [because it] appears 
to be a more generally applicable factor in determining whether section 
10(b)’s ‘in connection with’ requirement is satisfied.”351 
With respect to the defendant second level tippee’s knowledge about 
a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider, the Court analyzed the issue 
without any reference to personal benefit.352 For the Court, “the key factor 
was the tipper’s intent in providing the information.”353 The Court noted 
that the insider was aware of the confidentiality requirements of his 
company and subsequent breach of it.354 It is possible that, as in Warde, 
the Court was prepared to find breach of fiduciary duty regardless of 
whether a personal benefit was shown. Its decision could also simply 
reflect that the appellant did not raise personal benefit because it would 
have been a futile argument. There was clear evidence in the record that 
the insider newspaper employee was paid $200 in cash for each column 
he shared with the first level tippee,355 who testified at trial that he told 
Falcone about the scheme and Falcone paid the first level tippee the $200 
per column.356 
In any event, in the wake of Warde and Falcone, there was now an 
open question as to whether the fiduciary duty element—under either the 
traditional or misappropriation theories—could be satisfied by showing a 
knowing violation of the duty of confidentiality without showing 
knowledge of the personal benefit. 
In SEC v. Obus,357 the Second Circuit offered mixed signals on this 
question.358 As in Falcone, the case involved two levels of tipping. 
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Strickland, the insider, tipped his college friend, Black, and Black tipped 
his boss, Obus, who traded on the information.359 With respect to the 
insider’s liability, the Court returned to the personal benefit requirement 
and held, as in Warde, that where a tipper and tippee are good friends, the 
information can be viewed as a gift.360 “Dirks defined ‘personal benefit’ 
to include making a gift of information to a friend.”361 With respect to the 
second level tippee trader Obus’s liability, however, the Court focused 
exclusively on his awareness of the tipper, Strickland’s, breach of 
confidentiality, and did not discuss his awareness of Strickland’s intent to 
gift information to Black.362 Obus’s knowledge of the personal benefit to 
the insider appeared to be dropped from the analysis of the fiduciary duty 
breach altogether.363 
C. UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN AND THE RETURN TO DIRKS’ “SAFE 
HARBOR” 
That was the confused state of insider trading law when, during the 
financial crisis that began in 2008, the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Southern District of New York began unspooling a series of 
prosecutions that targeted institutional investors—specifically, the hedge 
fund industry.364 By this point, the class of institutional investors 
comprised of lightly-regulated hedge funds had mushroomed.365 In this 
exceedingly-competitive industry, each portfolio manager sought an 
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“edge,” an informational advantage that would distinguish one’s trading 
ideas over another.366 With enormous financial resources, the most 
successful hedge funds could engage in highly sophisticated research and 
analysis of corporate performance.367 To accommodate their appetite, an 
industry of expert consultants had also sprung up to provide the hedge 
funds with expert opinions about a product or company.368 Hedge funds 
often engaged consultants who were working on a product for a company 
that they were interested in trading.369 
When enforcement agents began peering into this industry, they 
quickly identified certain firms that they believed were engaged in 
exceptionally aggressive behavior and targeted them.370 These 
investigations were not focused on the “one-off” opportunistic trader who 
obtained access to confidential corporate information through corrupt 
payments or gifts of information from friends.371 Rather, they centered on 
the core practice of institutional investors who sought out inside 
information for a crucial edge for their trading strategies.372 In a legal 
environment where the key element of the insider’s personal benefit had 
been eroded, the institutional investors’ systematic use of nonpublic 
information struck the investigators as patently wrong.373 Using intensive 
investigative techniques that had previously been reserved for narcotics 
and organized crime figures, the Government executed search warrants 
on offices and obtained wiretap orders enabling them to intercept vast 
numbers of electronic communications.374 
These efforts yielded an extraordinary number of defendants. By the 
end of 2015, a number of hedge funds were shuttered, and 86 defendants 
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were reportedly convicted after trial or the entry of guilty pleas.375 Only a 
few challenged the Government at trial; Todd Newman and co-defendant 
Anthony Chiasson were two such defendants.376 
Although the Government prevailed before a jury, they then saw 
their case reversed and dismissed in the Second Circuit, as the panel, 
which included Judge Winter—the author of the comprehensive dissent 
and concurring opinion in Chestman—reprised the crucial element of 
personal benefit.377 In so doing, the Court sharply returned the caselaw to 
the letter and the spirit of Dirks, as it effectively reminded the 
Government that Dirks raised the hurdle for insider trading prosecution 
of institutional analysts and related investors.378 Indeed, the Court took 
the unusual step of broadly criticizing the Government’s “recent insider 
trading prosecutions, which are increasingly targeted at remote tippees 
many levels removed from corporate insiders.”379 
There were a number of unusual features to this case, not least of 
which was that the Government did not charge the “corporate insiders,” 
that is, those who are the principal violators of their fiduciary duties with 
any crimes,380 and they did not even testify as cooperating witnesses.381 In 
light of the Warde and Obus line of cases, prosecutors may have 
reasonably concluded such charges and testimony were not essential to a 
sound prosecution. Second, the defendant portfolio managers were a 
number of steps removed from communications with insiders.382 
Newman was a portfolio manager at Diamondback Capital 
Management, LLC (“Diamondback”), and Chiasson was a portfolio 
manager at Level Global Investors, L.P. (“Level Global”).383 The case 
involved two separate insider tippers at two companies: Rob Ray at Dell, 
and Chris Choi of Nvidia.384 As to Dell securities, Ray tipped Dell’s 
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earnings results, pre-public announcement, to Sandy Goyal, an analyst at 
an investment firm Neuberger Berman.385 Goyal in turn tipped 
Diamondback analyst Jesse Tortora who then tipped his manager, 
defendant Newman.386 In short, as to Dell, Newman was three steps 
removed from the insider. There was no evidence that he was aware of 
Ray as the source of the insider information.387 Tortora also tipped the 
Dell information to Level Global analyst, Spyridon Adondakis.388 
“Adondakis then passed along the Dell information to [defendant] 
Chiasson,” his manager.389 Thus, Chiasson was four steps removed from 
the insider and, as with Newman, there was no evidence Chiasson was 
aware of Ray as the source.390 
As to Nvidia securities, insider Choi tipped an acquaintance from 
church, Hyun Lim, about Nvidia’s quarterly earnings information pre-
public announcement.391 Lim tipped Danny Kuo, an analyst at investment 
firm Whittier Trust, and “Kuo circulated the information to the group of 
analyst friends, including Tortora and Adondakis, who in turn gave the 
information to Newman and Chiasson. This made Newman and Chiasson 
four levels removed from the [Nvidia] inside tippers.”392 
Unlike Warde, Falcone, and Obus, the Second Circuit squarely 
addressed the ultimate defendant tippee’s required level of knowledge. 
Reconnecting the personal benefit to the violation of duty element, the 
Court made clear that the Government had to prove that the ultimate 
tippee was aware of the insider tipper’s personal benefit, because 
Dirks counsels us that the exchange of confidential information for 
personal benefit is not separate from an insider’s fiduciary breach; it 
is the fiduciary breach that triggers liability for securities fraud under 
Rule 10b-5. For purposes of insider trading liability, the insider’s 
disclosure of confidential information, standing alone, is not a breach. 
Thus, without establishing that the tippee knows of the personal 
benefit received by the insider in exchange for the disclosure, the 
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Government cannot meet its burden of showing that the tippee knew 
of a breach.393 
Understandably, the Government protested because this rule seemed 
to run counter to Warde, Falcone, and Obus, discussed supra, Part I.B.8, 
but the Court dismissed the objections as “overreliance on our prior 
dicta.”394 It characterized the prior cases as ones that “generally involved 
tippees who directly participated in the tipper’s breach (and therefore had 
knowledge of the tipper’s disclosure for personal benefit) or tippees who 
were explicitly apprised of the tipper’s gain by an intermediary tippee.”395 
In contrast, the Court said it was unaware of “a single case in which 
tippees as remote as Newman and Chiasson have been held criminally 
liable for insider trading.”396 
The Court then directly addressed the theory of insider trading that 
“the Government might like the law to be,” as it reminded litigants that 
the Supreme Court had long since repudiated the theory of information 
parity in a fair marketplace.397 “[N]ot every instance of financial 
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under [section] 10(b).”398 
Instead, it noted, as Judge Winter wrote in Chestman, “[e]fficient capital 
markets depend on the protection of property rights in information. 
However, they also require that persons who acquire and act on 
information about companies be able to profit from the information they 
generate . . . . “399 The Supreme Court made clear that “insider trading 
liability is based on breaches of fiduciary duty, not on informational 
asymmetries. This is a critical limitation on insider trading liability that 
protects a corporation’s interests in confidentiality while promoting 
efficiency in the nation’s securities markets.”400 
In marching through the logic of Dirks to the current case, the 
Newman Court gave scant attention to the considerable tension between 
Dirks and the line of intervening Second Circuit cases that blurred Dirks’ 
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personal benefit requirement.401 It likewise failed to account for 
O’Hagan’s seeming embrace of “fair market” policy arguments in its 
adoption of the misappropriation theory.402 
Instead, the Newman Court strongly reaffirmed Dirks by holding that 
a “corporate insider breache[s] his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing 
confidential information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a personal benefit; 
[and] the tippee knew of the tipper’s breach, that is, he knew the 
information was confidential and divulged for personal benefit.”403 
Applying these standards, the jury instruction below was flawed because 
the jury could have found “that a defendant could be criminally liable for 
insider trading merely if such defendant knew that an insider had divulged 
information that was required to be kept confidential. But a breach of the 
duty of confidentiality is not fraudulent unless the tipper acts for personal 
benefit, that is to say, there is no breach unless the tipper ‘is in effect 
selling the information to its recipient for cash, reciprocal information, or 
other things of value for himself.’”404 
So far, while Newman could be viewed as having put the brakes on 
the Government, its reasoning closely adhered to Dirks and reclaimed the 
safe harbor for institutional analysts that Justice Powell intended.405 But, 
in the next part of its opinion, as the Court addressed what “personal 
benefit” means, it inserted a new requirement, a stronger safeguard, not 
expressly contained in Dirks: 
To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be inferred 
from a personal relationship between the tipper and tippee, where the 
tippee’s trades ‘resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a 
gift of the profits to the recipient,’ we hold that such an inference is 
impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary 
or similarly valuable nature.406 
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To defend this increased restriction on insider trading prosecutions, 
the Court relied on other cases that happened to involve facts pertaining 
to potentially pecuniary benefits in addition to friendship.407 
Because the evidence of the insiders’ personal benefit in tipping 
involved nothing more than “career advice” or membership in the same 
church, without any expectation of a quid pro quo, the Government had 
adduced insufficient evidence of a violation of fiduciary duty and the 
convictions had to be reversed.408 Moreover, according to the Court, “the 
Government presented absolutely no testimony or any other evidence that 
Newman and Chiasson knew that they were trading on information 
obtained from insiders, or that those insiders received any benefit in 
exchange for such disclosures, or even that Newman and Chiasson 
consciously avoided learning of these facts.”409 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recited the evidence 
demonstrating what institutional investors do on a routine basis as they 
probe and analyze corporate information that are accessible without resort 
to fiduciary duty violations.410 If Justice Powell only vaguely outlined 
their work as he emphasized their importance to efficient markets, the 
Newman Court’s description of the evidence detailed what that activity 
entails.411 
The evidence demonstrated that “analysts at hedge funds routinely 
estimate metrics such as revenue, gross margin, operating margin, and 
earnings per share through legitimate financial modeling using publicly 
available information and educated assumptions about industry and 
company trends.”412 “[A]nalysts routinely solicited information from 
companies in order to check assumptions in their models in advance of 
earnings announcements.”413 And in response, “investor relations 
departments routinely assisted analysts with developing their models.”414 
In fact, investor relations personnel routinely “leaked” earnings data in 
advance of quarterly earnings and other financial information “to 
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establish relationships with financial firms who might be in a position to 
buy” their stock.415 
As a consequence, the convictions of Newman and Chiasson were 
reversed on all counts, with instructions to dismiss the indictment with 
prejudice.416 The Government sought en banc review. When denied,417 it 
then sought certiorari relief from the Supreme Court but was again 
denied.418 Nearly four years had passed from the date the defendants were 
first indicted in January 2012, and their ordeal was finally over. 
In its effort at a rehearing, the Government claimed that the Newman 
Court imposed a new definition of personal benefit that was “deeply 
confounding and, contrary to the Panel’s express intention of supplying 
clarity, is certain to engender confusion among market participants, 
parties, judges, and juries.”419 In its certiorari petition, the Government 
promised the Supreme Court that “market participants and analysts who 
seek to comply with the law will lack clear guidance about the legal limits 
of their conduct,”420 that Newman’s reading “blurs the line between 
legitimate and prohibited activity,”421 and would engender “uncertainty in 
the financial community about the boundaries of legitimate conduct.”422 
The Government added that this “is particularly intolerable in the circuit 
that is home to the financial capital of the Nation, if not the world.”423 
Particularly troubling to the Government was Newman’s new rule: 
“To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be inferred from 
a personal relationship between the tipper and tippee, . . . such an 
inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature.”424 The Government complained that “[t]his is 
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flatly inconsistent with Dirks, as well as cases in this Circuit and others,” 
including Warde.425 
That was only partially true. While the new requirement was 
certainly inconsistent with the trend of the Second Circuit law, it was 
arguably fully consistent with the policy judgment underlying Dirks. 
Dirks sought to provide a zone of safety for institutional analysts because 
of their importance to the securities market by insisting on proof of the 
insider’s breach of fiduciary duty.426 Yet, as Professor Langevoort noted 
in 1990, the Court added language about reputational benefit and gifting 
that would open the door to future interpretive challenges.427 Justice 
Blackmun rightly assailed the personal benefit test, and in particular the 
gift theory. “[T]he Court does not explain why the benefit Secrist 
obtained—the good feeling of exposing a fraud and his enhanced 
reputation—is any different from the benefit to an insider who gives the 
information as a gift to a friend or relative.”428 
The Newman decision effectively offered to shore up a gap that Dirks 
had left open and to save it from Justice Blackmun’s unanswered 
challenge.429 Even where friends are involved, the Newman Court held the 
information must be in exchange for something meaningful; it cannot be 
a matter of mere good personal feelings.430 There has to be a discernible 
line for tippees to observe and act on—if gifts among “friends” were 
enough, the personal benefit requirement could become illusory. Thus, if 
Dirks’ requirement of an “objective” test means anything, there must be 
a showing that the insider actually benefited from disclosing the 
information not merely because he felt good about it. This is the necessary 
implication of concluding that Secrist did not personally benefit. Lacking 
pertinent statutory language or legislative history as a guide, the Newman 
Court’s new requirement reinforced Dirks’ effort to protect institutional 
analysts’ activity.431 
The impact of Newman was quickly felt in other cases.432 In United 
States v. Steinberg, where a portfolio manager for SAC Capital had been 
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separately tried and convicted of insider trading, the Government agreed 
to vacate his conviction in the wake of Newman, as well as the convictions 
on the basis of guilty pleas of six cooperating witnesses.433 In United 
States v. Conradt,434 four defendants who had pleaded guilty to insider 
trading were permitted by the Government and the district court to 
withdraw their guilty pleas after the Newman decision because the 
Government conceded that it had no proof any of them was aware of the 
insider obtaining any personal benefit in exchange for information.435 
This outcome was so troubling that it almost spurred Congress into 
action, as U.S. House Representative Jim Himes drafted a bill that 
received bipartisan support in the House.436 The bill, which was nearly 
identical to the Insider Trading Protection Act, would have codified the 
insider trading law to eliminate the personal benefit element.437 Himes 
claimed the bill was necessary because “there exists a fundamental 
disadvantage in prosecuting a crime that has never been properly 
defined.”438 John Coffee, a securities law professor at Columbia Law and 
acknowledged expert in the area, applauded the bill but characterized its 
impact differently, stating that it “closes the loophole created by the 
Newman decision.”439 That bill however was never advanced to a vote. 
D. THE SUPREME COURT REACTS IN SALMAN V. UNITED STATES 
While the Supreme Court denied certiorari review in Newman, it 
later granted certiorari to a defendant convicted of insider trading in the 
Ninth Circuit. Salman v. United States squarely presented a dispute about 
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the gift theory of the personal benefit element under Dirks.440 In Salman, 
the insider was the brother of the first level tippee, and that tippee in turn 
tipped Salman, the defendant, who traded on the information.441 In 
affirming the conviction, the Court noted—without adopting—the 
Government’s expansive view of the gift theory: “that a gift of 
confidential information to anyone, not just a ‘trading relative or friend,’ 
is enough to prove securities fraud . . . . Under the Government’s view, . 
. . a gift to a friend, a family member, or anyone else would support the 
inference that the tipper exploited the trading value of inside information 
for personal purposes and thus personally benefited from the 
disclosure.”442 The Court did not expressly adopt nor reject the 
Government’s construction of personal benefit.443 Instead, the Court 
merely retraced the origin of the gift theory to Dirks’s discussion444 and 
held that it applied squarely to support the conviction of Salman.445 
With respect to Newman, the Court essentially split the baby.446 It 
first quoted, with apparent approval, the portion of Newman’s holding that 
the inference of a personal benefit from a gift “‘is impermissible in the 
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship.’”447 But 
the Court rejected the part of the holding regarding a gain of “pecuniary 
or similarly valuable nature” even when making a gift to relatives or 
friends: “To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also 
receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in 
exchange for a gift to family or friends . . . this requirement is inconsistent 
with Dirks.”448 In short, “when a tipper gives inside information to ‘a 
trading relative or friend,’ the jury can infer that the tipper meant to 
provide the equivalent of a cash gift.”449 There need not be an additional 
showing, as Newman held, that the tipper expected to receive something 
of “a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”450 
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The Court went on to acknowledge, in something of an 
understatement, that: “[d]etermining whether an insider personally 
benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always 
be easy for courts . . . . But there is no need for us to address those difficult 
cases today, because this case involves precisely the gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative that Dirks envisioned.”451 
This was a punt. It is not easy for the courts to determine whether the 
personal benefit test has been met, even after a close examination at trial 
with 20/20 hindsight, but institutional investors reacting in real time are 
expected to make those perilous judgments on a daily basis.452 The peril 
was deepened when the Second Circuit issued its decision in Martoma. 
E. UNITED STATES V. MARTOMA AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S IMPASSE 
The Martoma decision revealed the deep fracture within the Second 
Circuit. The two opinions in United States v. Martoma453 demonstrated 
that the policy battle that Justices Powell and Blackmun waged in 1983, 
between information parity and market efficiency, continues to be waged 
among fair-minded judges.454 
Martoma was a portfolio manager at a hedge fund SAC Capital, who 
traded the stock of Elan Corporation and Wyeth Pharmaceuticals after he 
had a series of communications with Dr. Stanley Gilman, the alleged 
tipper.455 Elan and Wyeth were jointly developing an experimental drug 
called bapineuzumab to treat Alzheimer’s disease.456 To learn more about 
this drug, Martoma sought the help of expert networking firms and 
arranged paid consultations with doctors knowledgeable about 
Alzheimer’s disease.457 Through this network, Martoma was put in touch 
with two doctors who were working on the bapineuzumab clinical trial, 
Joel Ross and Dr. Gilman.458 Gilman was in fact chairman of the safety 
monitoring committee for the bapineuzumab clinical trial.459 
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Notwithstanding the confidentiality obligations Gilman and Ross owed to 
the companies and to the expert consulting network, they both disclosed 
confidential updates on the progress of the trial to Martoma.460 As in 
Newman, the principal “insider,” Dr. Gilman, was not charged, but did 
testify against Martoma under a non-prosecution agreement with the 
Government.461 Martoma was convicted of insider trading after a jury 
trial.462 On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the conviction and that the district court had not properly instructed the 
jury in compliance with the legal standards articulated in Newman.463 
More specifically, Martoma argued that he and Dr. Gilman did not 
have a “meaningfully close personal relationship” and that Dr. Gilman 
had not received any “objective, consequential  . . . gain of a pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature” in exchange for providing Martoma with 
confidential information.464 Even if the evidence might be viewed as 
satisfying these standards, Martoma argued, the jury was not properly 
instructed and thus, a retrial was necessary.465 
In rejecting these claims, the majority of the three-judge panel in 
Martoma, Chief Judge Robert Katzmann and Judge Denny Chin, issued 
two separate opinions, each time over the dissent of Judge Rosemary 
Pooler.466 Both majority opinions departed sharply from Newman.467 If the 
Newman Court sought to rein in the Government, Martoma loosened the 
leash, and then some.468 
1. Martoma I 
The majority in Martoma held that the evidence was in fact sufficient 
to prove the tippers obtained a personal benefit in sharing the confidential 
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information with Martoma.469 With respect to the jury instruction, Salman 
abrogated Newman and held that its “meaningfully close personal 
relationship’ requirement can no longer be sustained.”470 To reach this 
conclusion, the majority expanded the Dirks definition of gift and 
personal benefit, embracing the view espoused by the Government in 
Salman, a view that the Supreme Court had not adopted: 
[T]he ultimate inquiry under Dirks is whether a tipper has personally 
benefitted from a disclosure of inside information such that he has 
violated his fiduciary duty, and it is not apparent that the examples in 
Dirks support a categorical rule that an insider can never benefit 
personally from gifting inside information to people other than 
‘meaningfully close’ friends or family members—especially because 
the justification for construing gifts as involving a personal benefit is 
that ‘[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient,’ an observation that 
holds true even if the tipper and tippee were, for example, business 
school classmates who “had known each other for years” rather than 
close friends.”471 
Thus, the Martoma majority found an insider could obtain a personal 
benefit by gifting information to someone who was not a friend or 
relative.472 As to Newman, the majority argued that “a three-judge panel 
may issue an opinion that overrules Circuit precedent . . . where an 
intervening Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the prior ruling . . . . 
We respectfully conclude that Salman fundamentally altered the analysis 
underlying Newman’s ‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ 
requirement such that the ‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ 
requirement is no longer good law.”473 
Salman, however, had not impaired the requirement described in 
Newman—it merely abrogated the portion requiring a pecuniary benefit 
even where gifts among friends or relatives were involved.474 
Nevertheless, the majority reasoned that under Dirks and Salman there 
should be no “distinction between gifts to people with whom a tipper 
shares a ‘meaningfully close personal relationship’—a term left 
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undefined in Newman, but which apparently did not reach two people who 
‘had known each other for years, having both attended business school 
and worked . . . together,’—and gifts to those with whom a tipper does 
not share such a relationship.”475 Thus, the jury instruction was not 
erroneous when it stated that a “gift [given] with the goal of maintaining 
or developing a personal friendship or a useful networking contact” 
constitutes a personal benefit.476 Whether an existing friend or a potential 
future friend, “a tipper personally benefits by giving inside information in 
lieu of a cash gift.”477 
The Martoma majority went on to hold that in any event, the 
evidence was sufficient to convict Martoma even under the traditional 
personal benefit theory of a quid pro quo: “Dr. Gilman, the tipper, 
received substantial financial benefit in exchange for providing 
confidential information to Martoma. As discussed above, Dr. Gilman, 
over the course of approximately 18 months and 43 paid consultation 
sessions for which he billed $1,000 an hour, regularly and intentionally 
provided Martoma with confidential information from the bapineuzumab 
clinical trial.”478 
2. Martoma I Dissent 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Pooler explained why the majority view 
was directly at odds with Dirks: the “personal benefit” rule is “a limiting 
principle of liability. The rule allows many people—including reporters 
and stock analysts—not to worry that they will become felons or face civil 
liability for telling information to others who later happen to trade on it . 
. . . In holding that someone who gives a gift always receives a personal 
benefit from doing so, the majority strips the long-standing personal 
benefit rule of its limiting power. What counts as a ‘gift’ is vague and 
subjective. Juries, and, more dangerously, prosecutors, can now seize on 
this vagueness and subjectivity. The result will be liability in many cases 
where it could not previously lie.”479 
For Judge Pooler, Newman “attempted to specify what Dirks had left 
unclear—how close persons must be for a gift between them to count as 
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a benefit to the gift-giver.”480 There has to be a “meaningfully close 
personal relationship” in addition to a gift made “in the context of a 
relationship that ‘generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, 
and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable 
nature.’”481 While the Salman Court overturned the “pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature” portion of Newman, it “left Newman’s first 
holding [regarding meaningfully close personal relationship] 
untouched.”482 
Judge Pooler further noted that the majority’s new rule “exactly 
mirrors the government’s view pressed in Salman: that ‘a gift of 
confidential information to anyone, not just a “trading relative or friend,” 
is enough to prove securities fraud.’”483 The Supreme Court, however, did 
not adopt that view.484 It is curious indeed that the majority would 
understand Salman to require us to take a position that the Supreme Court 
explicitly considered but did not adopt.”485 
The dissent would have found the jury instruction to be erroneous486 
and argued that properly instructed, the jury could have rationally found 
that the Government failed to prove Martoma had a close personal 
relationship with Dr. Gilman487 or that Gilman received any pecuniary 
benefit from sharing confidential information with Martoma.488 
3. Martoma II 
Martoma petitioned for rehearing or reconsideration en banc, and in 
light of Judge Pooler’s vigorous dissent and the majority’s mistaken 
analysis of Salman’s impact on Newman, en banc might have been 
granted.489 But the majority issued an amended opinion, from which Judge 
Pooler again dissented.490 The majority retreated from its position that 
Salman had effectively abrogated the Newman holding that a gift theory 
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could only be applied in the context of a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship.”491 It nevertheless maintained that personal benefit could be 
proven solely with evidence that the tipper intended to benefit the tippee, 
even if the tippee was a total stranger.492 
The majority held that the jury instructions were erroneous “because 
they allowed the jury to find a personal benefit in the form of a ‘gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend’ without requiring 
the jury to find either that tipper and tippee shared a relationship 
suggesting a quid pro quo or that the tipper gifted confidential information 
with the intention to benefit the tippee.”493 The majority went on to 
conclude, however, that the error was harmless because one insider tipper 
received $70,000 in consulting fees, which “establishes the existence of a 
relationship suggesting a quid pro quo between the tipper and tippee.”494 
The conviction could also be affirmed because “at least one tipper 
received a personal benefit by disclosing inside information with the 
intention to benefit Martoma.”495 
The majority found support in the Warde decision to find the 
principle that “the personal benefit element is satisfied where there is 
evidence that the tipper “intend[ed] to benefit the . . . recipient.”496 But 
Warde involved two close friends who were tipper and tippee, and the 
Court did not address whether the “intent to benefit” test would be 
applicable even in the absence of a close friendship.497 Thus, the Warde 
Court held “[t]he close friendship between Downe and Warde suggests 
that Downe’s tip was ‘inten[ded] to benefit’ Warde, and therefore allows 
a jury finding that Downe’s tip breached a duty under [section] 10(b).”498 
The basis for the Martoma majority’s finding that “intent to benefit” 
is sufficient, without regard to relationships, is the grammar used in the 
Dirks decision: “For example, there may be a relationship between the 
insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or 
an intention to benefit the particular recipient.”499 Recognizing that this 
“key sentence of Dirks is admittedly ambiguous,” the Martoma majority 
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held that the “comma separating the ‘intention to benefit’ and 
‘relationship . . . suggesting a quid pro quo’ phrases can be read to sever 
any connection between them.500 The sentence, so understood, effectively 
reads, “there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or there may be an intention 
to benefit the particular recipient.”501 The Martoma majority then read 
Warde as adopting this reading, before stating matter-of-factly, “[w]e 
adhere to Warde.”502 
The majority argued that their analysis was also: “more consonant 
with Dirks as a whole. Because the existence of a breach ‘depends in large 
part on the purpose of the disclosure,’ [. . . ] it makes perfect sense to 
permit the government to prove a personal benefit with objective evidence 
of the tipper’s intent, without requiring in every case some additional 
evidence of the tipper-tippee relationship.”503 
To press their point, the majority posits a hypothetical scenario that 
starkly revealed the disconnect from the reasoning of Newman and Judge 
Pooler: 
[S]uppose a tipper discloses inside information to a perfect stranger 
and says, in effect, you can make a lot of money by trading on this. 
Under the dissent’s approach, this plain evidence that the tipper 
intended to benefit the tippee would be insufficient to show a breach 
of the tipper’s fiduciary duty to the firm due to the lack of a personal 
relationship. Dirks and Warde do not demand such a result. Rather, 
the statement “you can make a lot of money by trading on this,” 
following the disclosure of material non-public information, suggests 
an intention to benefit the tippee in breach of the insider’s fiduciary 
duty.504 
For the majority, it was obvious that an intention to benefit a tippee 
“proves a breach of fiduciary duty because it demonstrates that the tipper 
improperly used inside information for personal ends and thus lacked a 
legitimate corporate purpose.”505 
The majority went further to argue that its analysis was consistent 
even with Newman because “[i]mmediately after introducing the 
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‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ concept, Newman held that it 
‘requires evidence of a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the 
[latter].’”506 Thus, relying on Newman’s quoting the Dirks language that 
the majority determined to evidence a disjunctive approach to finding 
personal benefit, the majority suggested that Newman itself agreed with 
its reasoning: “We do no more than read literally Newman’s own 
explanation of its novel standard in light of these decisions, thereby 
fulfilling our legitimate function to construe and give effect to prior panel 
decisions.”507 
From this, the majority concluded that the jury instructions were in 
fact erroneous but not for the reasons Martoma suggested.508 Instead, “a 
properly instructed jury would have been informed that it could find a 
personal benefit based on a ‘gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative or friend’ only if it also found that Dr. Gilman and Martoma 
shared a relationship suggesting a quid pro quo or that Dr. Gilman 
intended to benefit Martoma with the inside information.”509 The 
inaccurate instructions were harmless, however, because the government 
“produced compelling evidence that Dr. Gilman, the tipper, ‘entered into 
a relationship of quid pro quo’ with Martoma” when he was paid for his 
consulting services.510 And, even if the evidence could not be viewed as 
quid pro quo “because Dr. Gilman did not bill Martoma for two key 
sessions, a rational jury could nonetheless find that Dr. Gilman personally 
benefited by disclosing inside information with the ‘intention to benefit’ 
Martoma.”511 
4. Martoma II Dissent 
The dissent characterized the Martoma II majority opinion as 
offering cosmetic changes to the flawed Martoma I opinion.512 Judge 
Pooler described the vanishingly small difference between Martoma I and 
II: “In their now withdrawn opinion, they held that a gratuitous tip could 
be understood as beneficial to the tipper so long as a jury were to conclude 
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that a tipper expected the tippee to trade on it. Now they hold that an 
uncompensated tip can be found to personally benefit the tipper so long 
as the jury were to conclude that the tipper intended to benefit the 
tippee.”513 The dissent stressed that such an interpretation of Dirks would 
undermine its crucial demand for objective facts.514 “The only objective 
facts the government would have to prove would be the communication 
of material non-public information. All of the protections of the personal 
benefit rule—a clear guide for conduct, preventing liability for slip ups 
and other innocent disclosures—would erode.”515 
It is difficult to read the full text of Dirks without concluding that the 
dissent had the better of that particular argument. Objective evidence of 
personal benefit was a key mechanism for preventing unjust prosecutions 
in Justice Powell’s mind. Pooler took pains to reiterate that Dirks sought 
to provide “a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be 
limited and instructed by the SEC’s inside-trading rules so that 
participants in securities markets are not left to the whims of prosecutorial 
enforcement priorities.”516 In particular, she noted the need to protect 
“persons outside the company such as an analyst or reporter who learns 
of inside information from the threat of prosecution for uncovering 
information about securities issuers just because they also traded on it.”517 
If objective criteria for finding personal benefit were replaced by 
mere “intent” or purpose of the tipper, Pooler argued, “[t]he difference 
between guilty and innocent conduct would be a matter of speculation 
into what a tippee knew or should have known about the tipper’s 
intent.”518 Here, the dissent channeled Justice Powell as she explained: 
A trader, journalist, or analyst attempting to avoid running afoul of 
criminal law would have little to guide her behavior. The conservative 
thing to do would be to avoid seeking inside information too 
aggressively, even if the whole market could benefit from such 
investigation. Those who decided to cultivate insider sources would 
risk prosecution in any case, so they might have fewer scruples about 
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compensating their sources and trading on the information they 
purchased.519 
Either way, the dissent suggests, the market loses.520 Where the line 
blurs, legitimate players fear to “ferret out” the information necessary for 
efficient pricing, and unscrupulous players become more brazen.521 
Contrary to the majority’s holding, Judge Pooler argued, neither 
Dirks nor any Second Circuit precedent ever held that the tipper’s intent 
to benefit was in and of itself sufficient to satisfy the personal benefit 
element. “The only time Dirks refers to an ‘intention to benefit’ is when 
it discusses the need to prove ‘a relationship between the insider and the 
recipient that suggests . . . an intention to benefit the particular 
recipient.’”522 
She also argued that the majority’s effort to disconnect the two 
concepts is deeply flawed.523 Where Dirks sought to provide examples of 
“objective facts and circumstances,” why would the Court “have 
mentioned an intention to benefit, which is a subjective fact, as an 
example of a personal benefit, which is an objective fact”?524 Moreover, 
why would the Court “have provided an intention to benefit a tippee as an 
example of a benefit to the tipper[?] Intending to benefit somebody is not 
in itself a benefit. That is, not unless one has reason to believe that the 
person with the intention to benefit benefits from the beneficiary’s benefit 
or one adopts the trivializing view of human psychology wherein 
everything any individual does is to benefit herself.”525 And, if the 
majority’s standalone “intent to benefit” test is all it takes to prove the 
tipper’s personal benefit, why would the Dirks Court “have adopted the 
personal benefit test in the first place”?526 As for the majority’s reliance 
on Warde, Judge Pooler retorted: “We found that the ‘close friendship 
between Downe and Warde suggests that Downe’s tip was “inten[ded] to 
benefit” Warde’ .  . . . Thus, we did not find that a freestanding ‘intention 
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to benefit’ would have been sufficient to prove Downe’s personal 
benefit.”527 
With respect to the majority’s hypothetical tipper who tips a “perfect 
stranger,” Judge Pooler had this blunt retort: 
The [majority] ask[s] us to imagine a situation where a tipper 
“discloses inside information to a perfect stranger and says, in effect, 
you can make a lot of money by trading on this.” [Martoma, 894 F.3d 
at 75].528 Wouldn’t it be absurd if this perfect stranger could not be 
held liable for insider trading if he went ahead and traded on this 
information? No, it would not be.529 
Dirks requires that the tipper receive a personal benefit. “That is the 
law whether we like or not.”530 Judge Pooler went on to remind the 
majority that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that there was any ambiguity on 
the topic in our precedents, Newman removed it by requiring a 
‘meaningfully close personal relationship’ in order to prove personal 
benefit via the gift theory.”531 
In conclusion, Judge Pooler’s dissent characterized the majority’s 
rule as “non-binding dicta,”532 and “[i]t is good news, then, that binding 
precedent stands for the opposite principle.”533 She then declared that 
“Newman remains good law.”534 
                                                                                                                 
 527. Id. at 84 (quoting Warde, 151 F.3d at 49). 
 528. Id. at 86 (quoting majority opinion at 75). 
 529. Id. (emphasis added). 
 530. Id. 
 531. Id. (quoting Newman, 773 F. 3d at 452). 
 532. Id. at 86–87. 
 533. Id. at 84. 
 534. Id. at 87. 
  While Judge Pooler’s dissent did not make this point, one could also argue that 
the SEC’s issuance of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) casts further doubt on 
Martoma II’s view that mere intent to benefit the tippee suffices for the personal benefit 
element of insider trading liability under Dirks. That rule, embodied in 17 C.F.R. § 
243.100, prohibits senior corporate insiders from making “selective disclosures” to 
analysts and institutional investors. 
   The SEC issued this rule in 2000 in an effort to stem the practice of corporate 
insiders regularly disclosing MNPI to their favorite analysts. As one commentator 
explained, the rule was “conceptually [] a brilliant end-run around Dirks” because that 
case held “a company official disclosing material nonpublic information to an analyst 
violates his/her fiduciary duty to the shareholders and Rule 10b-5 only if s/he ‘receives a 
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.’ This does not permit insiders 
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One would have thought that this impasse between the Newman 
panel and Judge Pooler on the one hand and Chief Judge Katzman and 
Judge Chin on the other was an intolerable condition to leave the law of 
insider trading. Yet, the Court refused defendant Martoma’s petition for 
rehearing en banc.535 All the cries of legal “uncertainty” coming from the 
Government536 and the defense537 remain unanswered.538 
F. MARTOMA’S IMPACT 
Insider trading prosecutions continue unabated, and Judge Pooler’s 
characterization of the Martoma majority’s rule as “non-binding dicta” 
has proven to be mistaken.539 Instead, accepting the majority’s invitation, 
the Government has argued that under Martoma II, personal benefit to the 
insider can be proven by merely showing that the insider intended to 
                                                                                                                 
to make a ‘gift’ of such information to friends or family, but does permit considerable 
latitude in what insiders disclose to securities analysts absent a quid pro quo.” 
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, INTRODUCTION TO SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND REGULATION 
FD, 2 SEC. LAW HANDBOOK § 33:46 (June 2019) (emphasis added). 
   The SEC appeared to admit as much, as it responded to opponents of Reg FD 
who urged the SEC to simply “use existing tools (namely, the law of insider trading) to 
bring individual enforcement actions in those cases that appear to involve significant 
selective disclosures.” The SEC claimed it considered this avenue but did “not agree that 
this is the appropriate response to the legal uncertainties posed by current insider trading 
law.” Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 FR 51716-01, at 51718. Put more 
plainly, in 2000, the SEC did not view Dirks as reaching intentional selective disclosure 
by insiders in the absence of proof of a personal benefit. Martoma II now effectively 
suggests that Dirks did intend to reach that conduct: any insider (classic or temporary, 
like Dr. Gilman) who discloses information with intent that the tippee investor would 
trade on it violates her fiduciary duty and is liable for insider trading. If this were so, it 
would seem the SEC went through a lot of trouble for nothing to issue Reg FD. 
  Moreover, if Martoma II is a correct statement of Dirks’ personal benefit 
requirement, what is one to make of the fact that Reg FD’s prohibition only applies to 
specified members of senior management and those in investor relations departments 
who regularly communicate with analysts and not more generally to all corporate 
representatives? See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.101(c) and (f). Not only would Reg FD have been 
redundant, it was incomplete. 
 535. See Order Denying Rehearing, Martoma, supra note 46. 
 536. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Newman, supra note 40, at *33. 
 537. See Amici Curiae Brief, Martoma, supra note 45, *5. 
 538. Martoma filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied 
in June 2019. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Martoma, No. 18-972 
(U.S. Jan. 24, 2019), 2019 WL 480568, cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2665 (2019). 
 539. Martoma, 894 F.3d at 86–87. 
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benefit the tippee regardless of the nature of their relationship with each 
other. Thus, in United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, the district court applied 
the Martoma II reasoning to hold that personal benefit can be proven by 
showing intent to benefit the tippee.540 The Court rejected a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege a close personal 
relationship between the tipper and tippee or a tipper’s personal benefit.541 
After all, the district court noted that Dirks itself says there may be “a 
relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro 
quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.”542 
The court did not address Judge Pooler’s argument that Martoma II’s 
reliance on the grammatical structure of the Dirks passage could not be 
squared with Dirks read as a whole. 
Separately, the Second Circuit issued a summary order in Rajat 
Gupta v. United States,543 which contained dicta indicating that the judges 
on that panel might also be inclined to adopt the Martoma majority’s view 
that mere intent to tip is enough for Dirks’s personal benefit test.544 The 
Court relied on a variety of bases to reject a collateral habeas challenge to 
an insider trading conviction after trial.545 But in so doing, the Court noted 
that Dirks “suggests varying sets of circumstances each of which would 
warrant a finding of the tipper’s illegal purpose.”546 It then cited 
Martoma’s holding that “The tipper’s intention to benefit the tippee 
proves a breach of fiduciary duty because it demonstrates that the tipper 
improperly used inside information for personal ends and thus lacked a 
legitimate corporate purpose.”547 The Court, however, stopped short of 
expressly adopting this rationale as another basis for rejecting Gupta’s 
challenge.548 
It remains to be seen what the next panel of Second Circuit judges 
will do when a new significant insider trading appeal squarely confronts 
the conflict between Newman and Martoma. That case may be Pinto-
Thomaz, and if it is not, another case will surely present a powerful 
                                                                                                                 
 540. See United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
 541. Id. 
 542. Id. at 299 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983)). 
 543. See Rajat Gupta v. United States, 913 F.3d 81, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 544. Id. at 86. 
 545. Id. at 84–85. 
 546. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
 547. Id. (citing United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 75 (2d Cir. 2017)). 
 548. Id. 
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challenge to Martoma, invoking Newman. It is easy to foresee another 
panel comprised of Judges Parker, Winter, Pooler, or anyone else who 
reads Dirks as they did, wanting to find a way to limit the reach of 
Martoma. Pooler’s dissent offers myriad bases for concluding that a 
gratuitous disclosure of corporate information to a “perfect stranger” 
cannot suffice for fraud under Dirks.549 
One thing is certain: when the next insider trading appeal is filed, the 
defense and the Government will take extraordinary interest in which 
three judges are assigned to the appeal.550 
II. A VAGUE LAW THAT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
When the Government lost its case in Newman, it declared that the 
law was left unclear,551 and when, two years later, the Court in Martoma 
issued its decision, the defense bar stated the same.552 They are both 
correct. An appraisal of the case law reveals there is in fact no clarity, 
under either Newman or Martoma, and certainly not under both. It may 
be that Congress will actually pass a law this time, ending the uncertainty, 
but this would not be the first time it has considered legislation only to 
abandon the effort.553 If so, it will leave an insider trading law that is 
unconstitutionally vague and thus void for vagueness. Two related 
constitutional doctrines support this conclusion: the Due Process Clause 
and the separation of powers doctrine. 
A. THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF THE LAW 
Constitutional and Anglo-American common law jurisprudence 
agree that in order to follow the law, one must be able to understand it. 
This principle is a prerequisite of ordered liberty. In Kolender v. Lawson, 
the Supreme Court said: “Our Constitution is designed to maximize 
individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 549. See United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64, 86 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 550. Of course, if the next criminal appeal involves conduct and a conviction that 
occurred after Congress passes an insider trading law—as the current draft of the Insider 
Trading Prohibition Act promises—the Newman/Martoma uncertainty will no longer be 
an issue. If the conduct precedes any legislation, however, the viability of the conviction 
may turn, again, on how the new panel of judges views the scope of Dirks. 
 551. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 552. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 553. See supra note 436 and accompanying text. 
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limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authority and 
content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression.”554 In 
Baggett v. Bullitt, the Court said that where statutes are vague, people 
“steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the 
forbidden areas were clearly marked,” causing them to “restrict[] their 
conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.”555 Justice Holmes 
expressed the requirement of fair notice succinctly in McBoyle v. United 
States: 
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text 
of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair 
warning should be given to the world in language that the common 
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line 
is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should 
be clear.556 
The Court has variously located the fair notice requirement in the 
common law’s long legal tradition or the Due Process Clause. In Collins 
v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,557 the Court held that a vague penal statute 
“violated the fundamental principles of justice embraced in the 
conception of due process of law in compelling men, on peril of 
indictment to guess” whether their conduct would later be deemed 
illegal.558 In a subsequent case, Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., the Court 
said the principle of clear notice was consistent with: “ordinary notions 
of fair play and the settled rules of law,” as well as “the first essential of 
due process of law.”559 “The crime, and the elements constituting it, must 
be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, 
in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue. Penal statutes 
prohibiting the doing of certain things, and providing a punishment for 
their violation, should not admit of such a double meaning that the citizen 
may act upon the one conception of its requirements and the courts upon 
                                                                                                                 
 554. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing M. Bassiouni, Substantive 
Criminal Law 53 (1978)). 
 555. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 556. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). 
 557. Collins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914) (construing Int’l 
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914), decided earlier that term). 
 558. Id. at 638. 
 559. Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
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another.”560 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions repeat similar 
expressions about why the fair notice rule is critical.561 
The “void-for-vagueness” doctrine enforces this rule. As the Court 
explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford, “[i]t is a basic principle of due 
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair 
warning.”562 The doctrine also prevents discriminatory enforcement by 
“policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis.”563 The Court has in recent years cited to this doctrine as it reversed 
convictions after high profile and hard-fought trials on the basis that the 
Government’s interpretations of the penal offenses swept too broadly, in 
violation of the Due Process clause.564 
                                                                                                                 
 560. Id. at 393 (quoting United States v. Cap. Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592, 598 
(D.C. Cir. 1910)). 
 561. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one may be 
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. 
All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”); Papachristou 
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“Living under a rule of law entails 
various suppositions, one of which is that ‘(all persons) are entitled to be informed as to 
what the State commands or forbids.’”) (quoting Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453). 
 562. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
 563. Id. at 109. 
 564. See e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016) (reversing 
conviction of former governor of Virginia accused of accepting bribes on grounds, inter 
alia, that Government’s interpretation of term “official act” is not defined “with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited,” or “in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”); Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (reversing conviction of former CEO of 
Enron on grounds that honest services theory of mail fraud is not void for vagueness as 
long as it is properly understood as prohibiting only kickbacks and bribery, and Skilling 
was not accused of such misconduct); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 415–16 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the statute should be stricken as unconstitutionally vague); see also Johnson 
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555–63 (2015) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)—
defining “violent felony” as any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another” void for vagueness under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1207 (2018) 
(applying void for vagueness doctrine to strike down as unconstitutional an immigration 
law that required deportation of any alien convicted of an “aggravated felony,” defined 
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It is hard to imagine a law that is more unconstitutionally vague than 
one that can deadlock the Second Circuit as to what constitutes illegal 
conduct. The meaning of the personal benefit element is not a transient 
question for institutional investors searching for legal technicalities. It is 
the difference between whether Newman was right or wrong in adjudging 
two portfolio managers not guilty of insider trading.565 
                                                                                                                 
as “a crime of violence.”); cf. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) 
(reversing conviction as obstruction statute is read narrowly: “[W]e ‘have traditionally 
exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of 
deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that a fair warning should 
be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the 
law intends to do if a certain line is passed.’”) (citations omitted). 
 565. One might argue that, in light of the Government’s ability to charge insider 
trading under Title 18’s anti-fraud statutes, the uncertainties in section 10(b) case law are 
largely immaterial. That would be wrong, however, as the Title 18 bases for insider 
trading prosecutions actually make the landscape more, not less, confusing. Indeed, 
Martoma can be read as making it easier to prosecute securities professionals for insider 
trading under section 10(b) than under Title 18’s anti-fraud statutes, sections 1341, 1343 
and 1348. Even before section 1348 was enacted in 2002, the Government successfully 
prosecuted insider trading on a misappropriation theory under the traditional mail and 
wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, respectively. See, e.g., United States v. 
Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
  Tellingly, the Government did not prosecute the hedge fund professionals 
Newman or Martoma under the fraud statutes. This was probably because the theory of 
information theft that fits more naturally in a straightforward fraud statute is ill-suited for 
prosecuting the conduct of securities professionals who are expected to seek out 
nonpublic corporate information. The defendants in Carpenter, in contrast, worked for 
the WSJ, whose confidential information was stolen so that the employee and his cohorts 
could financially benefit on the advance information. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22–23. This 
theory of fraud offers little guidance to the institutional investor who seeks a clear line 
between legal probing (and trading for profit) and illegal conduct. 
  Moreover, the Newman/Martoma disagreement about the meaning of “personal 
benefit” is not avoided by a Title 18-based prosecution of insider trading, because 
Carpenter’s embrace of the fraud-based theory of misappropriation itself assumed a 
scheme for personal pecuniary benefit. See id. at 27–28 (embezzlement is “‘the fraudulent 
appropriation to one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another’“ 
(quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902)). Id. (“It is well established, as a general 
proposition, that a person who acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge 
or information for his own personal benefit but must account to his principal for any 
profits derived therefrom.”). 
  Put simply, information is stolen to obtain a personal benefit. One could argue 
that Title 18 fraud-based insider trading prosecutions may be harder now than section 
10(b) prosecutions under the Martoma majority’s construction because Martoma appears 
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B. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 
As previously noted, under the separation of powers doctrine, it is 
Congress, not the courts, that has the constitutional power to define 
federal crimes.566 Had the insider trading law been subjected to the 
legislative process at its inception, the warring policy goals of market 
regulation would presumably have been resolved at the outset, enabling 
the law-makers to issue clearer rules. 
There is an intimate connection between the due process requirement 
that laws be clear and the separation of powers doctrine.567 In the context 
of discussing the rule of lenity, Justice Scalia said that providing “fair 
notice” is “not the only function performed by the rule of lenity; equally 
important, it vindicates the principle that only the legislature may define 
crimes and fix punishments. Congress cannot, through ambiguity, 
effectively leave that function to the courts, much less to the 
administrative bureaucracy.”568 
Justice Gorsuch elaborated on this same principle. The “void for 
vagueness doctrine, at least properly conceived, serves as a faithful 
expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the 
framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under our Constitution.”569 
He explained “[i]t is for the people, through their elected representatives, 
to choose the rules that will govern their future conduct.”570 Judges cannot 
                                                                                                                 
to remove the personal pecuniary benefit element, while arguably Title 18 fraud still 
requires it. It is difficult to imagine a Carpenter-endorsed fraud prosecution of a tippee 
who received confidential information from an insider who simply sought to gift it to the 
tippee for no other reason than a feeling of good will. 
 566. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812); Daniel C. Richman, Federal 
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 757, 761 n.13 (1999) (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997) 
(“Federal crimes are defined by Congress, not the courts . . . .”); see also Whalen v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) (“[W]ithin our federal constitutional framework 
. . ., the power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed 
upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress.”). 
 567. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as 
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012) (“The meaning of ‘due process 
of law’ and the related term ‘law of the land’ evolved over a several-hundred-year period, 
driven, we argue, by the increasing institutional separation of lawmaking from law 
enforcing and law interpreting.”). 
 568. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820)). 
 569. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1224 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 570. Id. at 1227. 
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“craft new laws to govern future conduct, but only to ‘discer[n] the course 
prescribed by law’ as it currently exists and to ‘follow it’ in resolving 
disputes between the people over past events.”571 Under the constitutional 
structure, “legislators may not ‘abdicate their responsibilities for setting 
the standards of the criminal law,’ . . . by leaving to judges the power to 
decide ‘the various crimes includable in [a] vague phrase,’ . . . For ‘if the 
legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and 
leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully 
detained, and who should be set at large[,][t]his would, to some extent, 
substitute the judicial for the legislative department of government.’”572 
Gorsuch observed: “Nor is the worry only that vague laws risk 
allowing judges to assume legislative power. Vague laws also threaten to 
transfer legislative power to police and prosecutors, leaving to them the 
job of shaping a vague statute’s contours through their enforcement 
decisions.”573 
Grayned prohibited precisely what the common law origins of 
insider trading law permitted. It employs vague language and concepts 
that continue to evolve based on fact-intensive disputes. The federal law 
enforcement apparatus determines which cases to bring in its effort to 
“shap[e] a vague [law’s] contours through their enforcement decisions.” 
And vital, “basic policy matters,” pertaining to regulation of information 
flow in the capital markets is “delegate[d] . . . to policemen, judges and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.”574 The 
congressional abdication is particularly troubling where, as discussed 
supra p. 6, it was the “prosecutor,” in the form of the SEC, who repeatedly 
persuaded Congress to leave them flexibility to bring enforcement actions 
on a case-by-case basis.575 The Government has succeeded in protecting 
its flexibility, but this has come at the expense of the law’s integrity. This 
is the kind of outcome Justice Jackson feared when the law is so vague it 
leaves prosecutors and judges the freedom to “condem[n] all that [they] 
personally disapprove [] for no better reason than [they] disapprove it.”576 
Insider trading law, of course, is not alone as a species of federal 
common law. Prodded by inventive prosecutions, courts regularly engage 
                                                                                                                 
 571. Id. (quoting Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824)). 
 572. Id. 
 573. Id. at 1227–28 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 
(1972)). 
 574. Id. 
 575. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 576. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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in such elaborate interpretation of ambiguous or open-ended statutory 
language and they effectively create new bodies of law.577 In particular, 
the Government has for many decades persuaded the courts to evolve the 
meaning of “fraud” to encompass the latest instance of conduct it deems 
harmful and thus worthy of punishment.578 
Insider trading law, however, is unique in that it is premised more on 
policy judgments about a highly specialized activity vital to our national 
economy than on any words in a statute. The conceptual gap between the 
word “fraud” in section 10(b) and trading on information others do not 
have is not resolved by studying the language of the Exchange Act. Justice 
Powell claimed there must be an exchange of information for personal 
benefit while Justice Blackmun disagreed.579 The key to this debate is not 
linguistic, but rather, policy. It is this same policy debate that led to an 
impasse between the Newman panel and Judge Pooler, who construed 
Dirks in a manner that sought to enlarge its protection of the institutional 
analyst’s work, and the Martoma majority judges who condemned the 
conduct that such interpretation might condone in the marketplace. As the 
                                                                                                                 
 577. For an extensive discussion of the ways in which the federal courts have engaged 
in common law-making in the field of federal criminal law through elaborate 
interpretation of broad statutory terms, see Daniel C. Richman et al., Defining Federal 
Crimes, 181–265 (discussing evolution of theories of mail and wire fraud), 265–335 
(discussing evolution of extortion theories), 429–502 (discussing criminal civil rights law 
enforcement) (1st ed. 2014). 
 578. Before 1987, the Government had persuaded the courts to interpret the mail and 
wire fraud statutes so as to prohibit deprivations of “intangible rights” such as honest 
services. When the Supreme Court in United States v. McNally held that the statutory 
language could not be stretched so far and should be construed to apply only to tangible 
property rights, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346, to expressly prohibit schemes to 
deprive one of honest services. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
  But the Government pushed the limits of that language as well, winning the 
conviction of Enron’s CEO Jeffrey Skilling in part on the basis of an honest services 
fraud theory, with the lower courts approving the Government’s expensive reading. The 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the statute as applied 
to his case but nevertheless reined in the Government, declaring that honest services fraud 
should be read to mean only bribes and kickbacks. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 
358 (2010). 
  In his concurrence, Justice Scalia opined that he would have declared the statute 
unconstitutional rather than trying to save the statute by redefining its limits: “in 
transforming the prohibition of ‘honest-services fraud’ into a prohibition of ‘bribery and 
kick-backs,’ [the Court] is wielding a power we long ago abjured: the power to define 
new federal crimes.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 579. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647, 676 (1983). 
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latest, but not last, word, the Martoma majority supported Blackmun’s 
effort to prevent a marketplace where trading on confidential information 
is permitted. 
The separation of powers doctrine would suggest it is irrelevant 
whether every judge to entertain an insider trading prosecution agrees 
with the Martoma majority. Neither the Dirks nor the Martoma courts had 
constitutional authority—or expertise—to decide this difficult policy 
issue.580 In the past, Congress may have acceded to the SEC’s desire for 
maximum flexibility in law enforcement discretion,581 but that abdication 
to the regulators led to the judiciary’s decades-long, futile struggle to 
make sense of this law. 
In light of the implications of insider trading law to the country’s 
securities market, few laws demand congressional attention more than 
this one. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AT LAST? 
By recently taking up the bill, dubbed the Insider Trading Prohibition 
Act (ITPA),582 the House of Representatives appears to recognize the 
pressing need for clarity and its own duty to undertake the process of 
legislation. History offers a cautionary warning, however, that the ITPA 
may yet become mired in indecision so that the Senate will ultimately 
decline to act. As discussed, a nearly identical version of the ITPA was 
drafted in 2015 in the wake of Newman and then abandoned.583 One hopes 
that is not the fate of this initiative, but the current draft of the ITPA 
                                                                                                                 
 580. See generally id.; see also United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 581. Some might argue that Congress effectively ratified the law of insider trading 
by, for example, passing 18 U.S.C. § 1348 in 2002, which the Government has sometimes 
relied on to bring insider trading charges. See, e.g., United States v. Blaszczak, 308 F. 
Supp. 3d 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2811 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 2018); 
United States v. Mahaffey, 693 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2012). But that would be inaccurate. 
Section 1348 was passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of the Enron 
scandal and there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress had insider 
trading in mind. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2–6 (2002) (discussing “shortcomings 
in current law” that Enron exposed, with no reference to insider trading cases). Its recent 
drafting of the ITPA further suggests that the current state of the judge-made law is 
inadequate. 
 582. See Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. § 16A (as approved 
by H.R. Fin. Serv. Comm., May 8, 2019, and committed to the H. Comm. of the Whole, 
Sept. 27, 2019) [hereinafter ITPA]. 
 583. See supra note 436 and accompanying text. 
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suggests that there is much work still left to be done in the Senate. It 
seemingly fails to account for market efficiency interests and, if passed, 
might have deleterious impacts on the securities market. 
A. THE TERMS OF THE ITPA 
The ITPA supports Justice Blackmun’s vision of information parity 
in pursuit of a fairer and more equitable marketplace.584 It proposes to 
amend Section 16 of the Exchange Act by adding Section 16A, which 
would prohibit trading while in possession of MNPI “if such person 
knows, or recklessly disregards, that such information has been obtained 
wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use 
of such information.”585 The “wrongful” criteria would apply “only if the 
information has been obtained by, or its communication or use would 
constitute, directly or indirectly,” acts such as theft, bribery, 
misrepresentation, conversion, misappropriation (or similar “deceptive 
taking” of information), a breach of a fiduciary duty, confidentiality 
agreement, or breach of a contract, as well as a “breach of any other 
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence.”586 As for the level 
of knowledge of the trader relating to how the MNPI was obtained, the 
law would provide: 
It shall not be necessary that the person trading while in possession of 
such information . . . . knows the specific means by which the 
information was obtained or communicated, or whether any personal 
benefit was paid or promised by or to any person in the chain of 
communication, so long as the person trading while in possession of 
such information or making the communication, as the case may be, 
was aware, consciously avoided being aware, or recklessly 
disregarded that such information was wrongfully obtained or 
communicated.587 
The effect of the ITPA would be to prohibit any trading while in 
possession of any confidential material information. Whether the insider 
gave the information for a personal benefit would be irrelevant. As long 
as that person did so in violation of some agreement or duty to keep the 
                                                                                                                 
 584. See generally Dirks, 463 U.S. 674–79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 585. ITPA, H.R. 2534 § 16A(a). 
 586. Id. at §§ 16(A)(c)(1)(A)–(D). 
 587. Id. at § 16(A)(c)(2). After this Article went to print, the House modified the bill 
to include a personal benefit element. See discussion infra at footnote 620. 
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information confidential, trading while in possession of it would be 
“wrongful” and illegal. 
B. DIRKS’ CONCERN FOR MARKET EFFICIENCY IS UNADDRESSED 
The ITPA is an obvious departure from the 35-plus years of judge-
made law. It removes the personal benefit element altogether and also 
prohibits not only trading “on the basis of” MNPI, but any trading “while 
in possession of” such information. In effect, if an investor has the 
information, that person cannot trade, even if the bases for the trade are 
unrelated and properly acquired information. 
While the blanket rule surely provides greater clarity, it does not 
appear to accommodate the efficient market interest in giving institutional 
analysts room to probe aggressively for information so that their investor 
clients can trade on such information. Thus, the ITPA raises the obvious 
question of whether Justice Powell and the other members of the Dirks 
majority, as well as Judge Winter in Chestman, the Newman panel, and 
Judge Pooler were all mistaken when they feared the potential chilling 
effect a blanket prohibition on MNPI would have on the important work 
of analysts. 
Dirks’ “safe harbor” for analysts was premised on the belief that a 
pure “disclose or abstain” rule “could have an inhibiting influence on the 
role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to 
the preservation of a healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to 
‘ferret out and analyze information,’ . . . and this often is done by meeting 
with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders.”588 
“[M]arket efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] 
initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the analyst’s 
work redounds to the benefit of all investors.”589 
Similarly, in Newman, the Court echoed Judge Winter’s observation 
in Chestman that: “[e]fficient capital markets depend on the protection of 
property rights in information. However, they also require that persons 
who acquire and act on information about companies be able to profit 
from the information they generate . . . .” 590 Thus, “insider trading liability 
                                                                                                                 
 588. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658–59. 
 589. Id. at 658 n.17 (citation omitted). 
 590. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448–49 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Dirks, 
463 U.S. at 662 and United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, 
J., concurring)). 
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is based on breaches of fiduciary duty, not on informational asymmetries. 
This is a critical limitation on insider trading liability that protects a 
corporation’s interests in confidentiality while promoting efficiency in the 
nation’s securities markets.”591 
The Court thus examined the evidence at trial relating to analysts’ 
legitimate functions, including the fact that “analysts routinely solicited 
information from companies,”592 and in response, “investor relations 
departments routinely assisted analysts with developing their models.”593 
In fact, investor relations personnel routinely “leaked” earnings data in 
advance of quarterly earnings and other financial information “to 
establish relationships with financial firms who might be in a position to 
buy” their stock.594 
Similarly, in her dissent in Martoma, Judge Pooler discussed the 
need to protect “persons outside the company such as an analyst or 
reporter who learns of inside information from the threat of prosecution 
for uncovering information about securities issuers just because they also 
traded on it.”595 If objective evidence of personal benefit were no longer 
an element of insider trading, she warned, analysts and traders may be 
fear to engage in aggressive probing for information “even if the whole 
market could benefit from such investigation.”596 
These concerns did not arise in a vacuum. Long before Chiarella or 
Dirks, scholars argued that insider trading should not be illegal at all, and 
that the activity actually speeds up the dissemination of relevant 
information to the marketplace.597 Professor Carol Swanson outlined such 
historic views among scholars and economists who “have rebutted 
fairness concerns, arguing that an emotional approach too often glosses 
over the underlying economics.”598 “In essence, deregulation advocates 
asserted that if insider trading is economically efficient, there remains no 
                                                                                                                 
 591. Id. at 449. 
 592. Id. 
 593. Id. 
 594. Id. at 454–55. 
 595. Martoma, 894 F.3d at 81 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664). 
 596. Id. at 81–82. 
 597. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, THE FREE PRESS 
59–76, 111–46 (1966); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 
VAND. L. REV. 547, 565–576 (1970). 
 598. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading, supra note 36, at 1163. 
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compelling independent basis for asserting unfairness” because “stock 
prices already reflect the risk of insider trading.”599 
Consistent with this thinking, Professor Daniel Fischel made the 
argument, in effect, that Dirks’s protection of institutional investors did 
not go far enough and that such investors should be exempt from insider 
trading restrictions altogether. He first chided fairness advocates arguing, 
“without some understanding of the economic consequences of different 
kinds of actions . . . legal analysis is reduced to a vacuous recitation of 
clichés and talismanic phrases devoid of analytical content. If insider 
trading is beneficial to investors because it increases their wealth, for 
example, it would be irrational to interpret the fiduciary duty owed to 
investors, the supposed beneficiaries of fiduciary duties, as prohibiting 
the practice.”600 He then proceeded to extol the role of investment 
analysts, as he explained, “These market professionals create social 
benefits by reducing problems of asymmetric information faced by 
competing sellers of securities and by monitoring the actions of corporate 
managers. They may also provide private benefits to investors who rely 
on their recommendations in an attempt to earn abnormal positive returns. 
Because of these social and private benefits . . . legal rules should act to 
increase, not decrease, the private returns of information acquisition, and 
analysts should be free of legal rules restricting the use of inside 
information.”601 
Such an approach disregards the gravitational pull of our desire for 
equity, but it is not irrational. The efficient market thesis suggests that all 
available information about a company’s value is promptly reflected in 
its price.602 If the goal is the swiftest impoundment of corporate 
information in the price of its stock, the theory goes, the sooner people 
trade on the information, the better. According to this view, information 
disparity is a necessary condition for efficient trading by profit-motivated 
trading. After all, in every trade, one party wishes to sell, thinking of 
profiting, while the other party buys thinking it is a fair price. As Justice 
Powell put it, “as market values fluctuate and investors act on inevitably 
                                                                                                                 
 599. Id. 
 600. Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic 
Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127, 129 
(1984). 
 601. Id. at 130. 
 602. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988) (noting that fraud on the 
market theory assumes that widely-followed securities of the larger corporations are 
“efficiently” priced: the market price of stocks reflects all available public information). 
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incomplete or incorrect information, there always are winners and 
losers.”603 Indeed, “in many cases there may be no clear causal connection 
between inside trading and outsiders’ losses.”604 Market efficiency purists 
would use this point to say that if someone has MNPI about a company, 
the sooner that person trades on it, the sooner the true value of the stock 
will be attained.605 
Understandably, Justice Powell and the majority in Dirks would not 
go quite so far, as his “sense of propriety abhorred the abuse of trust that 
insider trading represented.”606 He condemned abusive behavior where 
the insider is given access to confidential information by virtue of the 
trusted position with the company and then acts to enrich himself with 
that information to the detriment of a corporate shareholder.607 Under that 
specific circumstance, Dirks would say, the insider defrauded, acted 
immorally, and cheated. Absent the violation of duty motivated by an 
intent to reap a personal benefit, however, there would appear to be no 
basis for censure. 
C. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ITPA ON SECURITIES MARKET 
What happens to the efficiency of the market if one cannot trade 
while in possession of MNPI derived from a breach of some 
confidentiality obligation? Here, it may help to review what the proponent 
of an efficient market might say about the risk/reward analysis of a 
hypothetical portfolio manager (the “PM”) at an institutional investment 
firm: 
The PM is highly motivated to make money for the fund but also to 
abide by the law, and he has dutifully attended all the compliance-training 
programs and understood the outlines of the law, though he is not a 
lawyer. He understands that meetings or calls with insiders pose risks, but 
the law does not prohibit such interactions and, indeed, he believes it is 
not possible to do the job without testing the accuracy of the company’s 
public statements or getting more “color” and nuance about what those 
public representations really mean. This is important because a 
company’s public statements can be self-serving and incomplete. Under 
                                                                                                                 
 603. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 n.27 (1983). 
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 605. See generally id. 
 606. Pritchard, supra note 67, at 936. 
 607. Id. at 937. 
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the law, the companies are not required to disclose unfavorable 
information, unless the omission of that information will make the rest of 
the company’s statements materially misleading.608 As an experienced 
PM, he recognizes that one of the most helpful tools to testing the 
reliability of public corporate representations is through one-on-one 
meetings with key corporate employees. 
Moreover, he understands that the law recognizes that part of the job 
is to build, and trade on the basis of, a “mosaic” of information regarding 
a company. The Second Circuit noted that “[a] skilled analyst with 
knowledge of the company and the industry may piece seemingly 
inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic 
which reveals material non-public information” for that analyst.609 He has 
to be careful that the information learned during a one-on-one meeting 
with a corporate representative is not, in and of itself “material,” as 
opposed to merely important to the mosaic of information.610 He has never 
                                                                                                                 
 608. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 45 (2011). 
 609. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 610. The element of materiality is notoriously elusive. The common definition is 
“information regarding an undisclosed fact is material when there is a substantial 
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Couture, Materiality and a Theory of Legal Circularity, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 543 (2015); 
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A 
Call For Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131 (2003). To make matters worse for institutional 
investors, what exactly is the difference between a material fact that a reasonable investor 
would consider important and data that is a key determinant when fit into an analyst’s 
mosaic? While the investing community has made persistent calls for the SEC to provide 
a clear, workable definition of materiality, the regulator has consistently demurred, once 
again preferring to reserve for itself enforcement flexibility on a case-by-case basis. Thus, 
for example, in justifying its refusal to define materiality in promulgating Reg FD, the 
SEC declared: “the general materiality standard has always been understood to 
encompass the necessary flexibility to fit the circumstances of each case.” Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 FR 51716-01, at 51735; see also SEC v. Bausch & 
Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The SEC itself has despaired of providing 
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gotten a clear explanation for how to make that distinction in a consistent 
and reliable way, but he tries. He must also consider whether the key piece 
of information from the insider that is valued was nonpublic.611 He thinks 
pieces of it are in the public realm, but he is not positive, and time is short. 
This is a lot to think about and, unfortunately, not a single factor is 
all that clear. The risk of a regulator second-guessing the PM later as to 
any one of them is always there. But before Martoma and the ITPA, one 
key factor provided substantial comfort: there is no known personal 
benefit to the insider. The PM is unaware of any payments to the insider 
for the information the PM learns from a meeting with her. He would 
never engage in paying the insider, nor would he permit his analysts to do 
so. Neither he nor his analyst is a relative of the insider’s or a close friend 
such that the information could reasonably be considered a “gift” of 
trading information to her. 
The PM also recognizes that there is additional gray area when, as 
the Newman Court recognized, insiders leak information because they 
seek to maintain a favorable relationship with an important investor or 
analyst—either sell side or buy side.612 This is not a “personal benefit” for 
the insider as the motivation is to benefit the company, not the corporate 
representative. 
                                                                                                                 
written guidelines to advise wary corporate management of the distinctions between 
material and non-material information, and instead has chosen to rely on an after-the-
fact, case-by-case approach, seeking injunctive relief when it believes that the appropriate 
boundaries have been breached.”) (citing address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the 
SEC, “An Inside Look at Rule 10b-5,” ALI-ABA Conference, April 10, 1975). This 
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 611. This too can be a tricky concept. Information is “nonpublic” if it “has not been 
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v. Seibel Systems, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing SEC v. Texas 
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the SEC’s complaint. 
 612. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 455 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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The tendency of insiders to do this, however, led to the SEC’s Reg 
FD in 2000, which is meant to prevent selective disclosure to favored 
analysts.613 However, it still occurs, as Newman recognized in 2015.614 
Even when that happens, Reg FD does not prohibit him from trading 
because its purpose was to prevent the insider’s conduct. Reg FD says 
nothing about the investor’s obligation. Moreover, the insiders his 
analysts meet with are often not senior management of a company or a 
representative of the investor relations department, and Reg FD only 
applies to such corporate employees. Often, the PM or his firm learns 
helpful information from lower level employees in the sales channel or in 
the finance departments. 
In the absence of any bribe or personal relationship, the investor 
thinks, the uncertainties about materiality or nonpublic status pose risks 
in any one-on-one meeting with an insider, but they are relatively 
manageable. That was the intent of Dirks and was clearly reinforced in 
Newman. 
Those are the “risks” of meetings with an insider; now, what about 
the rewards? What can the PM hope to gain from the meetings? After all, 
he has access to publicly issued, detailed statements from the company, 
including detailed financial information. He has access to full market and 
industry information. He can participate in large conference calls with 
management and many other analysts and investors. Why risk any legal 
exposure by having one-on-one meetings? 
The answer is that a well-placed and knowledgeable set of probing 
questions can elicit answers from the insider that provide key insights for 
the PM. Sometimes, the tone and body language signal how much 
confidence this corporate employee really has in the official projections 
and factual representations. Small inconsistencies in responses can mean 
a great deal. They can confirm the PM’s thesis about the company built 
from a variety of sources suggesting the company’s public statements are 
not accurate. Sometimes, the insiders inadvertently make statements that 
are in themselves highly revealing, possibly even material on their own. 
The PM can use the information to make a profitable or loss-avoidance 
trade that others may not make. 
Based on his modeling of the company, influenced by the 
information he learned from the insider, the PM believes the company’s 
projections are inflated and overly optimistic. He decides to sell a large 
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block of shares to protect his position. He and his fund effect trades that 
are significant enough in size to affect the price of stock because it can 
influence other large investors to trade in his same direction. This happens 
because he is respected for his disciplined approach to company analysis; 
his modeling is said to be rigorous and his substantive expertise in the 
products sold in the industry he covers is formidable. He also has an 
excellent track record. If the block trade is large enough, some may even 
suspect he obtained MNPI and avidly trade in the same direction as he. 
His trades of large blocks will cause the price of the stock to decrease. 
Assuming his assessment was correct and the company’s official 
projections were too optimistic, the price reached as a result of his activity 
will be the fairer value. 
If the ITPA is passed, however, such efforts at fair valuation may be 
deterred. The absence of any personal benefit to the insider will no longer 
protect the PM from an insider trading prosecution. Where the disclosure 
of information in breach of any confidentiality obligation is considered 
“wrongfully” obtained information leading to criminal liability for those 
who trade while in possession of it, the PM may reasonably consider 
terminating the practice of having any individualized meetings or calls 
with insiders (or permitting his analysts to have such interactions). After 
all, who can say with certainty if even innocuous comments by the insider 
breached some confidentiality obligation? Even if the PM did not believe 
there was a breach, the risk of a regulator later claiming that the PM 
“recklessly disregarded” the confidential nature of the information is 
substantial.615 Moreover, while the PM may have believed he received 
nonmaterial information that was nevertheless important to the 
investment mosaic he had created on the company, the regulator could 
easily disagree and claim he traded on material information. In theory, if 
one of the PM’s analysts becomes aware of confidential information that 
could be considered material, the PM may be forced to freeze any trades 
in the subject company even if he would have traded in the stock without 
regard to the analyst’s new information. The risk/reward calculation is 
thus altered. The risk to him personally may far outweigh the benefit to 
his fund of trying to learn more from the insider. 
If this calculus causes a PM to forego any meetings with insiders, he 
will lose a traditional and important tool for analyzing the companies he 
follows. Profit-driven, incentivized investigations for accurate 
information may be chilled. To be sure, he will still have other tools 
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available to him, based on publicly available information and the 
information equally available to all investors, retail and institutional. But 
his trades may look the same as those of all other investors. If the same 
risk/reward calculus is made by the entire class of institutional analysts 
and investors, the impact could be market-wide. Important pricing 
adjustments that might have occurred where institutional investors 
engaged in profit-incentivized investigations may be lost as a 
consequence. This is the outcome the Dirks Court sought to avoid.616 
Perhaps House members already examined this possibility and 
concluded that the impact would actually be minimal. For example, 
proponents of the bill could argue that the ITPA’s elimination of the 
personal benefit element should not deter the law-abiding analyst from 
one-on-one meetings because most such analysts already steer clear from 
any disclosed information that was in and of itself material. And if they 
did encounter such information, compliance and legal departments of 
well-run institutional investors did not rely on whether the personal 
benefit test was satisfied. Instead, they have long taken the prudent course 
to put a stock on the restricted list if they became aware of any MNPI, 
however obtained. Thus, they would argue, we should not expect the 
ITPA to impact the current efficiency of the market. 
This theory would suggest that the rigorous, profit-driven trading 
Dirks envisioned has not been the reality for some time now, and that the 
conduct of portfolio managers like Newman or Chiasson reflects an 
undesirable fringe that the market is better off prohibiting in clear terms. 
Perhaps the House concluded that while there might be some marginal 
delay or inaccuracy in pricing, the cost of that is outweighed by the benefit 
of a clear-cut rule that eliminates the use of confidential information from 
the marketplace. 
If the Democratic Majority members of the House Finance 
Committee came to this conclusion, the Minority Republicans did not. In 
voicing their nonsupport for the bill, they stated: 
Reading the personal benefit test out of the law could have real 
implications; for example, absent a personal benefit test, corporate 
insiders who share information with the full expectation of 
confidentiality would become subject to prosecution simply because 
that confidentiality was violated . . . . At worst, [the bill] is overbroad 
                                                                                                                 
 616. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
94 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
and will criminalize beneficial trading as well as chill the productive 
flow of information within the marketplace.617 
It is not clear whether economists or other market experts are able to 
quantify the loss of market efficiency, if any, from the ITPA’s rule. The 
Dirks Court assumed a deleterious impact, and its concerns were not 
unreasonable given basic market efficiency principles. But the Court, of 
course, was structurally incapable of conducting an examination of the 
empirical support for its concerns.618 There is no evidence that the House 
made that examination when drafting the ITPA. One would expect the 
Senate to undertake this important review. 
Given that the health of the securities market is at issue, one hopes 
for comprehensive deliberation, complete with detailed hearings at which 
the perspectives of securities experts, economists, institutional investors, 
issuers (represented by senior management and investor relations 
departments), individual investors, and regulators, among others, would 
be carefully evaluated. This may require examination of the extent to 
which the institutional investor community still relies on one-on-one 
meetings, for what purposes, and how any bill would either deter or 
encourage such activities. After such examination, the legislators may 
conclude that, in fact, market valuation would be materially impacted and 
that some other clear rule must be added to avoid such impact. 
The judiciary struggled to find some balance between the competing 
interests in information parity and market efficiency. Congress has the 
opportunity to legislate that balance based on a factual study. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever the outcome, if Congress acts as it now appears poised to 
do, the democratic process will finally have worked as designed. The 
legislature will have decided upon a clear statute putting institutional 
analysts and investors on notice of where the legal line is drawn. To reach 
that goal, there may be more legislative work to do and it may prove to 
be difficult. But as Justice Gorsuch put it: “[u]nder the Constitution, the 
adoption of new laws restricting liberty is supposed to be a hard business, 
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the product of an open and public debate among a large and diverse 
number of elected representatives.”619 
After fifty years of the “evolving” judge-made law of insider trading, 
the Newman/Martoma impasse may have finally driven Congress to 
undertake the difficult task of defining the law of insider trading. One can 
only hope the solution is clear as well as consistent with the nation’s 
interest in a robust securities market.620 
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personal benefit that has bedeviled the courts, without offering any clarification about 
what the term means. By using the word “including,” does the bill mean to suggest that 
“personal benefits” is not necessarily limited to pecuniary gain, reputational benefit, or 
gift to a relative or friend, and might include merely a charitable desire to gift information 
to a perfect stranger as Martoma II’s majority concluded? That reading likely is not one 
Congressman McHenry would agree with since it tends to dilute the force of a personal 
benefit element. But it is a fair reading of the language. Moreover, what constitutes a 
“friend” to whom a gifting of confidential information constitutes a crime?  Must the 
person be very close, as Newman suggested or is a casual friendly relationship enough? 
One of the proponents of the original draft, Professor John Coffee of Columbia Law 
School, understandably expressed disappointment with this eleventh-hour amendment, 
stating that the change eliminated the “key element” which was meant to clarify the 
convoluted state of the law and that the change “makes it less of a reform bill.” Andrew 
Kragie & Jody Godoy, House Passes 1st Explicit Ban on Insider Trading, LAW360  
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/1225615/house-passes-1st-
explicit-ban-on-insider-trading?nl_pk=1a4a648a-a128-4d8c-aea8-9685d2247633&utm 
_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=whitecollar. The challenge 
of legislating an insider trading law cannot be addressed by simply adopting the language 
with which courts have struggled. An empirical study of what kind of marketplace the 
country needs may lead to clearer language about the scope of prohibition on trading. 
